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ABSTRACT
This article argues for a constitutional right to counsel for state inmates in all initial federal
habeas corpus proceedings based on access-to-the-courts doctrine. The doctrine guarantees an
indigent inmate a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts in incarceration-related
litigation, including post-conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court initially articulated the
access right, in relevant part, as merely prohibiting states from actively interfering with an
indigent inmate’s efforts at pursuing post-conviction relief from a criminal judgment. Today,
though still fairly inscrutable in dimension, the access right has evolved to require states in certain
circumstances to provide affirmative assistance to inmates to ensure constitutionally adequate
access to the writ.
1

2

In Pennsylvania v. Finley and Murray v. Giarratano, a pair of decisions rendered in 1987
and 1989, respectively, the Supreme Court held that the right of access does not require assistance
of counsel in either noncapital or capital state post-conviction proceedings, at least insofar as the
inmate seeks to raise claims litigated on direct appeal. The primary rationale in Finley and
Giarrantano was that habeas litigants have enjoyed assistance of counsel at trial and on direct
appeal, and thus should be able simply to parrot that work product in the federal habeas forum to
obtain judicial review of any cognizable claims. The Court analogized to an earlier case, Ross v.
3
Moffitt, in which it had held no right to counsel attaches in discretionary appeals. The Court
has never addressed the issue whether the access right demands assistance of counsel in federal
habeas proceedings. But the lack of such right appeared a foregone conclusion after Finley and
Giarratano.
On April 24, 1996, however, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which introduced a myriad of exceedingly complex procedural requirements -most significantly, a one-year statute of limitations -- that a petitioner must satisfy in order to
obtain merits review of claims set forth in a federal habeas petition. For the prototypical pro se
habeas litigant, these requirements, in particular the statute of limitations, erected an impenetrable
wall around federal judicial review of merits claims. Indeed, the effect of AEDPA’s enactment has
been to stymie many pro se inmates’ efforts at obtaining federal habeas review of state court
judgments. Yet, to date, the Supreme Court has not recognized a right to counsel in federal habeas
corpus. Federal courts, while struggling mightily to make sense of a poorly drafted statute,
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continue to abide by a literal fiction in assuming that most inmates are sufficiently competent to
navigate post-AEDPA federal habeas practice without assistance of counsel.
This article argues that absent constitutionally guaranteed assistance of counsel in federal habeas
corpus and a concomitant remedy where that assistance falls short, AEDPA’s procedural
intricacies function to deny the indigent, pro se state inmate the right to meaningful access to the
courts in federal habeas proceedings. As such, absent repeal of AEDPA, the access right requires
recognition of a right to assistance of counsel in filing a first federal petition. This right would
extend only to navigating and comprehending the procedural complexity of federal habeas under
AEDPA, rather than to the articulation and framing of substantive claims and subsequent
litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The impetus for this Article derives from my work as a staff attorney with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where I was responsible
for reviewing requests for certificates of appealability, which are required by statute in order to appeal district court denials of federal
habeas corpus petitions, and making recommendations to motions
panels regarding whether the certificates should issue. This work required my review of federal petitions and the district court rulings.
In the more than four years I spent at the court, I reviewed and presented to motions panels over 800 petitions. Virtually all of these petitions were prepared pro se, often handwritten on court-issued forms
or typed out on old typewriters. As a lawyer with substantial expe4
rience in the federal criminal justice system, by far the most challenging issues for me to unpack were procedural in nature. Difficulties frequently emerged from the thin language of the governing
statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2253–2255, as amended by the Antiter5
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and the
number of unresolved questions that have resulted. Typically, once—
or rather, if—the litigant cleared the procedural hurdles, the appropriate disposition of the merits of a particular petition became readily
apparent. Throughout this work, I never ceased to be astonished by
the legal expectation, grounded in the absence of a recognized right
to counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings, that inmates navigate AEDPA’s complexity successfully in order to obtain judicial review of the merits of their claims. In the trial context, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “[w]hile a criminal trial is not a game in
which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near
match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladia6
tors.” What I witnessed in federal habeas practice for non-capital,
pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter.

4

5
6

Prior to working at the Ninth Circuit, I spent a year clerking on that court, two years as an
Attorney-Advisor at the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, where I provided legal advice to the Executive Branch primarily on criminal procedure issues, and
five years as a trial and appellate lawyer with the Federal Public Defender’s Office in Los
Angeles.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (internal citation omitted). In Cronic,
the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s presumption of ineffectiveness where a young and
inexperienced trial counsel had only twenty-five days to prepare a complex, serious case
and some witnesses were not easily accessible. Id. at 664–65.
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Indeed, statistics bear out my experience. A recent study conducted by Vanderbilt Law School found that over 90% of non-capital
habeas cases involve pro se litigants. Moreover, district courts dismiss
as untimely more than one in five non-capital cases, the vast majority
of which are uncounseled. In practice, without assistance of counsel,
7
AEDPA has shrouded the Great Writ in an impenetrable fog, leaving
merits review of claims that a state inmate raises in a federal petition
to little more than the fortuity of access to a competent jailhouse lawyer.
The instant Article argues that AEDPA’s procedural intricacies,
coupled with a lack of a constitutional right to assistance of counsel,
function to deny the indigent, pro se state inmate the right to meaningful access to the courts in pursuit of the Great Writ. As such, absent repeal of AEDPA, the access right should require recognition of
a right to assistance of counsel for state inmates in filing a first federal
petition. Because a right to counsel requires effective assistance of
counsel, petitioners would have a meaningful remedy should counsel
be unavailable or render ineffective assistance in apprehending the
procedural strictures of the AEDPA. In this way, we can begin to
clear a path through AEDPA’s procedural thicket for the indigent
habeas petitioner and ensure the constitutional guarantee of meaningful access to judicial review.
In practical consequence, the proposal is a radical one. States
8
have fallen far short in realizing Gideon v. Wainwright’s decades-old
9
promise of a right to counsel at trial. Thus, to imagine a right to
counsel in federal habeas may seem both decadent and unrealistic.
But it is precisely because Gideon’s dream has not fully materialized
that habeas corpus occupies such a crucial role in our criminal justice
system. Without an effective, accessible habeas writ, inmates who suffer at the hands of incompetent trial or appellate counsel are at best,
lost to the system; at worst, they lose their lives. Beyond the personal
cost to those directly affected, we, as a society, are left with the stain
of that injustice.

7

8
9

The federal writ of habeas corpus is commonly referred to as the “Great Writ of Liberty”
(or simply, the “Great Writ”), which is the term that dates to the Magna Charta. See generally LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS HABEAS CORPUS 14–15 (2003).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (recognizing indigent state criminal
defendants’ right to assistance of counsel at trial).
See generally Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33
STETSON L. REV. 181, 290 (2003) (noting “an ongoing struggle in the United States between the constitutional ideal of assigned counsel for indigents and its actual implementation in practice”).
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This Article is structured as follows: Part I identifies the problem,
i.e., the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas
corpus and the near impenetrability of post-AEDPA federal habeas
practice for pro se litigants. Part II sets forth the access-to-the-courts
doctrine as a framework for recognition of a constitutional right to
counsel in federal habeas. Part III applies the access doctrine to
AEDPA, arguing that the right to meaningful access demands assistance of counsel in navigating AEDPA’s procedural thicket. Lastly,
Part IV explores different models for implementation of an accessbased right to counsel in federal habeas corpus.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF NAVIGATING AEDPA’S
PROCEDURAL MORASS WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. The Lack of a Recognized Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal
Habeas Proceedings
To date, the Supreme Court has only recognized a constitutional
10
right to counsel for the criminally accused at trial and on the first
11
direct appeal of right. This right extends to all felony defendants as
well as misdemeanor defendants who face a potential loss of life or
12
liberty. Moreover, the right to counsel at trial extends to all “critical
stages of the proceedings” against the defendant, and not merely to
13
the trial itself. But the Court has declined to recognize a constitutional right to counsel in seeking discretionary review before a state’s
10

11
12

13

See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for federal criminal defendants facing loss of life or liberty); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 65–66, 71 (1932) (recognizing Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel for capital defendants); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (extending Powell to noncapital criminal defendants).
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963) (recognizing due process and
equal protection right to counsel on first appeal).
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (recognizing right to counsel in misdemeanor cases even where sentencing court suspends a prison or jail sentence and imposes probation); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (noting in dicta that,
for felony cases, the right to counsel does not depend on potential incarceration); Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (finding that whether an indigent defendant has the
right to appointment of counsel under Gideon depends on the ultimate sanction imposed); see also Jacob, supra note 9, at 280 (explaining that the Court’s holdings in Gideon
and Douglas entitle indigent defendants to state-appointed counsel at trial and for the first
appeal of right).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235–37 (1967) (concluding that post-indictment
lineup is a critical stage of prosecution, and thus, the right to counsel attaches); see also
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187–88 (1984) (holding that the right to counsel
attaches at preliminary hearing and arraignment only if certain rights are at risk, but attaches unconditionally at sentencing).
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supreme court or in filing a petition for writ of certiorari before the
14
United States Supreme Court.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has also declined to recognize a constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, at
least insofar as the petitioner seeks to raise claims previously litigated
15
at trial or on appeal. As I will discuss in greater depth in Part II, in
Pennsylvania v. Finley, decided in 1987, the Court rejected a claim that
the constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts requires
16
assistance of counsel in state, non-capital habeas proceedings. Rather, the Court held that a pro se inmate’s access to the trial record
and the appellate briefs and opinions suffice to provide meaningful
17
access to the courts for post-conviction litigation. Thus, as with discretionary appeals, no constitutional right to counsel attaches during
18
state post-conviction proceedings.
Two years later, in Murray v. Giarratano, a plurality of the Court affirmed Finley and concluded, in relevant part, that the constitutional
guarantee of meaningful access to the courts also does not require
assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings involv19
ing capital defendants. Specifically, in Murray, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, O’Connor, and Scalia, rejected the argument by Virginia death row inmates that assistance of counsel was
necessary in order to ensure their constitutional right of access to the
20
courts in state habeas proceedings, as guaranteed by Bounds v. Smith.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the judgment, but noted that “[t]he complexity of [Supreme Court] jurispru-

14

15

16

17
18
19
20

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974) (concluding due process and equal protection interests underlying right to counsel on direct appeal do not extend to discretionary
review by the state’s high court).
See generally Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 541 (2009) (arguing for a right to counsel in habeas corpus for claims
unique to habeas proceedings, for which the petitioner has not yet had assistance of
counsel). But cf. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012) (holding attorney abandonment of client provides basis for “cause” to excuse procedural default caused thereby); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010) (finding extraordinary ineffective assistance of counsel may justify equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations).
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–57, 559 (1987) (rejecting right to counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings on both access-to-the-courts and due process, fundamental fairness grounds).
Id. at 557.
Id.
492 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1989).
Id. at 3–4, 12; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”).
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dence in this area . . . makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be
able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the assis21
tance of persons learned in the law.” Nonetheless, he agreed petitioners had failed to state a claim for relief because, to date, no capital petitioner in Virginia had been unable to obtain counsel to assist
in habeas proceedings and state prisons had staff attorneys to assist
22
inmates with preparing their petitions. Thus, Justice Kennedy was
23
“not prepared to say that this scheme violates the Constitution.”
Seven years later, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court modified its holding
in Bounds to make clear that the access right does not encompass as24
sistance with investigating claims and litigating them effectively. Rather, the right encompasses only assistance in getting through the
courthouse doors, as opposed to a right to substantive assistance with
25
one’s case once inside. The Court further held that to show an
access violation, a petitioner must demonstrate actual injury, i.e., that
the State’s failure to provide adequate assistance impeded the petitioner in his efforts to pursue a legal claim in post-conviction pro26
ceedings.
The Court has not addressed whether a right to counsel attaches
in federal habeas proceedings. But federal courts since Finley, Giarratano, and Lewis generally have assumed that both capital and noncapital inmates do not have a constitutional right to counsel in feder27
al habeas corpus proceedings. This judicial mindset has remained
intact despite the dramatic overhaul and inordinate complication of
28
federal habeas practice wrought by AEDPA. The complexity of postAEDPA federal habeas practice calls for re-examination of the issue
and recognition of a limited right to counsel to ensure the indigent
state inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts in federal
habeas proceedings.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 351–60 (analyzing the “actual injury” requirement).
United States v. Pollard, 389 F.3d 101, 111 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez-Macias,
335 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 2003).
Within the past year, the Supreme Court has twice recognized actual or potential relief
from some of AEDPA’s strictures based on extreme failings of counsel. See Maples v.
Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (holding that attorney abandonment of client provides basis for “cause” to excuse procedural default caused thereby); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2549 (2010) (finding extraordinary ineffective assistance of counsel may justify equitable
tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations).
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B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which substantially narrowed the
29
legal parameters of federal habeas review. Conservative advocates
had been attempting to place limits on capital habeas corpus for dec30
ades. Critics identified habeas practice, rather than the many flaws
and irregularities that often accompany capital convictions, as the
31
source of unacceptable delay between conviction and execution. Efforts at restricting the Great Writ eventually found traction with the
domestic terrorist bombing of the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah
32
Federal Building, in which 168 people perished. The emotional aftermath of the bombing, and a concomitant desire to see “swift and
certain justice” imposed on the perpetrators, aligned with Republican
majorities in Congress to provide the necessary catalyst for statutory
33
change.
34
In relevant part, AEDPA revised 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2253–
35
2255, which govern all federal habeas corpus proceedings. AEDPA
also created a new Chapter 154 of the Judicial Code for state capital
cases that provides for rules favorable to the State if the State meets
certain conditions, including providing assistance of counsel in state

29
30

31

32

33

34

35

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S4363 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1996) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) (“Reform of our habeas corpus system has been needed, and needed badly, for
several decades now.”).
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H3603–04 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Henry
Hyde) (“Somehow, somewhere we are going to end the charade of endless habeas proceedings, and this bill is going to do it.”); 142 CONG. REC. S3459 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“But just look at the highlights of this antiterrorism bill.
Capital punishment reform, death penalty reform, something that has been needed for
years, decades. It is being abused all over the country. There are better than 3000 people
who have been living on death row for years with the sentences never carried out . . . .”).
Terror Hits Home: Oklahoma City Bombing, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited April 22,
2012).
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S4363 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1996) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) (“The Oklahoma City bombing finally provided the clarion call that made it possible for the Republican majority, with President Clinton’s reluctant acquiescence, and
over stiff resistance by a majority of the Democrats, to enact reforms to this legal quagmire.”).
Title I of AEDPA revised the federal habeas statutes; the remaining titles are unrelated.
See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27 n.1 (1997) (noting the other titles address victim restitution, international terrorism, weapons and explosives restrictions, and “miscellaneous items,” respectively).
See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326–27.
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36

post-conviction proceedings. The Congressional Conference Committee report summarized AEDPA’s purpose in revising federal habeas practice as follows: “This title incorporates reforms to curb the
abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute
37
problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases.” Similarly, President Clinton’s signing statement to AEDPA declared the statute’s intent as being to “streamline [f]ederal appeals for convicted
criminals sentenced to the death penalty,” though not to alter subs38
tantively the standards for issuance of the writ.
Despite its stated target of capital cases, AEDPA, as enacted, fundamentally changed longstanding provisions governing all federal
habeas corpus practice involving challenges to the legality of criminal
39
convictions. Most significantly, the statute introduced a one-year
statute of limitations to filing any federal habeas petition, introduced
a ban on filing second or successive petitions, and limited the scope
of substantive review. At the same time, AEDPA left intact the preexisting doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default. Federal
courts have devoted substantial energy since 1996 attempting to understand the intricate mechanics of the statute of limitations as applied, as well as its interplay with the remaining procedural doctrines.
The resulting body of law is inordinately complex and vexing to even
the most experienced of jurists.
This Article does not attempt a thorough exposition of these pro40
cedural doctrines. Rather, what follows is merely a general overview
of the doctrines that function, at times in concert, to block access to
the courts for the pro se habeas litigant.

36

37
38
39
40

Id. at 327 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, ch. 154, 110 Stat. 1221–1226 (1996), amended by the USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006)). To date, no
state has been able to satisfy these heightened requirements. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES
S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.3[a] (6th ed. 2011)
[hereinafter 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN] (addressing the fact that, as of yet, no state has been
able to meet the opt-in requirements). Hence, this Article does not address the implications of those provisions.
H.R. REP. NO. 104–518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra
note 36, at § 3.2 (quoting the Conference Committee Report).
Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 720 (Apr. 24, 1996).
See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (“The enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the landscape for federal habeas petitions.”).
For the authoritative treatise on the nuances, intricacies, and history of federal habeas
corpus, see 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36; 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter 2 HERTZ
& LIEBMAN].
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C. Expecting the Impossible: The Introduction of a One-Year Statute of
Limitations
Until 1996, there was no fixed time limit for filing a federal habeas petition challenging a state conviction. The only constraint was
a flexible rule of “prejudicial delay,” which resembled in effect the
41
equitable doctrine of laches. AEDPA introduced a one-year statute
of limitations for filing § 2254 petitions challenging a state criminal
42
judgment and § 2255 motions attacking a federal criminal judg43
ment. To understand the dramatic impact of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations requires an examination of its complex mechanics.
Under §§ 2244(d) and 2255, the one-year statute of limitations
does not start to run until the challenged state or federal judgment
becomes final, any state or government-created impediments to filing
are removed, the constitutional right asserted is first recognized by
the United States Supreme Court if made retroactively applicable to
collateral review, or the factual or legal bases for a claim become
41
42

43

1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2.
Under AEDPA, for state inmates who seek federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
§ 2244(d) of that title now provides:
(1) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a [s]tate court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by [s]tate
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
the applicant was prevented from filing by such [s]tate action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for [s]tate postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.
For federal inmates seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006), the revised statute provides:
A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental
action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
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44

available.
For state inmates, the time during which state postconviction proceedings pertinent to the judgment the inmate seeks
to challenge in federal court are pending tolls the one-year statute of
limitations. In light of these myriad triggering and tolling dates, calculation of the statute of limitations, particularly under § 2244(d) for
state inmates, has proven extremely challenging. Indeed, at virtually
every analytical juncture, difficult issues have emerged. Successfully
navigating these hurdles requires both legal skill and, where judicial
precedent is lacking, the ability to anticipate accurately AEDPA’s contours. Absent the fortuity of an available and competent “jailhouse
lawyer”—i.e., a fellow inmate self-educated in the legal process who
45
assists other inmates in litigating claims and cases —pro se state inmate litigants who seek federal habeas relief are stymied first by the
lack of sufficient legal skills to calculate the filing requirements.
Second, even where some assistance is provided, legal missteps are
not uncommon by even highly competent counsel. But absent a
right to counsel in the first instance, the petitioner is left without a
remedy to correct any mistake, including those that function to slam
the courthouse door shut on substantive merits review of federal habeas claims.
1. The Challenge of Figuring Out Even Where to Begin: Calculating the
Elusive Triggering Date for the Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations does not start to run until the judgment
46
an inmate seeks to challenge “becom[es] final.” But what does this
mean? That is, how does an inmate translate these two words into
practice in his own case? As with many of the most difficult issues
47
posed under AEDPA, the statute itself is silent on the issue.
As an initial matter, the inmate must determine whether to look
to state or federal law in assessing finality. Federal appellate courts
disagree to some extent as to the role of state law in defining “finali48
ty” under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, the burden will be on the peti44
45

46
47

48



28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D), 2255 (2006).
See Evan R. Seamone, Fahrenheit 451 on Cell Block D: A Bar Examination to Safeguard America’s Jailhouse Lawyers from the Post-Lewis Blaze Consuming Their Law Libraries, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 91, 93–94 (2006) (describing in relevant part the characteristics and role of
the “jailhouse lawyer”).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006).
The Supreme Court has noted finality under § 2244(d) “is a concept that has been ‘variously defined . . . [and] like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context.’” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009).
Compare Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693–95 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider
state law that set date of finality of judgment with the Court of Appeals’ issuance of
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tioner to determine whether his jurisdiction honors state law in assessing finality. As with all of AEDPA’s statute of limitations intricacies, an error in calculation can doom a federal petition to dismissal
as untimely.
But federal courts have generally agreed on several triggering
principles. First, when the petitioner pursues all available direct appeals within the state or federal system, including discretionary appeals, the triggering event is either the completion of certiorari proceedings in the United States Supreme Court or the expiration of
49
time within which to file a petition for writ of certiorari. Second, if
no direct appeal is filed, the conviction becomes final at the expira50
tion of the time for filing such appeal. The same rule obtains where
51
a petitioner files an untimely notice of appeal. Thus, if state law
permits a defendant thirty days to file a notice of appeal of a conviction by trial or guilty plea, but instead he or she waits a year to do so,
AEDPA’s statute of limitations will start to run after thirty days. As a
result, only one month will remain to file a federal habeas petition by
the time the state notice of appeal is filed. Similarly, where a petitioner files a first direct appeal to the state intermediate appellate
court but does not pursue a further direct appeal to a higher state
court, the triggering event becomes the date of expiration for filing
52
the appeal to the higher appellate court. The result is that AEDPA’s
trigger date, i.e., when the sand begins to slip through the proverbial
hour glass for federal habeas review, is a moving target, dependent
on what relief a petitioner seeks, or fails to seek, on direct review. Yet
the calculation is critical for it is obvious that only in knowing when

49

50

51
52

mandate), and Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897–98, 898 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding conviction became “final” under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when state appellate court
denied motion to modify ruling, despite state courts’ use of date of issuance of mandate
as point of finality of judgment), with Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir.
2001) (finding judgment becomes final on date of issuance of mandate, as provided by
Florida state law).
E.g., Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 119; Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 524–25, 527 (2003); Robinson v. United States, 416 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1176
(2006); Nix v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Crosby v. Nix, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); see also 1 HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.45.
E.g., United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2008); Moshier v. United
States, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d
565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.48.
E.g., Randle v. Crawford, 578 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 2009); Bethea v. Girdich, 293
F.3d 577, 578 (2d Cir. 2002).
E.g., Roberts, 319 F.3d at 693–95; Wixom, 264 F.3d at 898; Gendron v. United States, 154
F.3d 672, 674 nn.1–2 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Ahitow v. Glass,
526 U.S. 1113 (1999); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.49.
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the one-year statute of limitations starts to run can a petitioner have a
chance at determining when it ends.
2. Impediments to Filing: Once the Clock Has Started to Tick, What, if
Anything, Will Cause it to Stop?
Regardless of when a conviction becomes final, thus triggering the
start of the one-year period of time to file a federal petition, the statute of limitations will not run under § 2244(d) during any period in
which a state or government-created “impediment” prevents the peti53
tioner from filing the petition or motion. Such impediments can
exist prior to the conviction becoming final, thus forestalling the start
of the statute of limitations. Or an impediment can arise once the
statute of limitations has already started to run, thus stopping the
clock until such time as the State clears the path to filing by removing
the impediment. But once again, AEDPA does not delineate what
54
constitutes a state or government-created impediment. To make
matters even more difficult, circuit case law grappling with the doctrine is relatively sparse.
At minimum, courts appear to exempt the role of the judiciary
from “state action,” instead requiring the actor to be an arm of either
the prosecutor or the penological institution charged with the peti55
tioner’s detention. Thus, a change in state law that provides a new
basis for relief will not qualify as an impediment because, notwithstanding the prior adverse precedent, the petitioner was still free to
56
raise such a claim in a federal petition “at any time.” In other words,
a pro se petitioner is expected to anticipate future changes in the law
that will inure to his favor and seek habeas relief on a ground for
57
which no legal support exists.
53

54
55

56
57



28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B), 2255 (2006); see also Bryant v. Schriro, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060
(9th Cir. 2007) (“To obtain relief under § 2244(d)(1)(B), the petitioner must show a
causal connection between the unlawful impediment and his failure to file a timely habeas petition.” (internal citation omitted)); Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553, 556–57
(6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting relief based on impediment for lack of causation).
See Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that “the word ‘impediment’ is
not defined in the statute itself, nor is it self-elucidating”).
Compare Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 665–66 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that negative case
law rendering futile raising of claim in state court did not constitute state-created “impediment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)), with Critchley v. Thaler, 586 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir.
2009) (finding that failure of county clerk’s office to timely file petition for postconviction relief constitutes “impediment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)).
Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Minter, 230 F.3d at
665–66.
Unless the Supreme Court makes a change to the substantive law underlying a constitutional claim retroactive, even if the prior state of the law were deemed an “impediment,”
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To date, some circuits have recognized as a possible impediment
the State’s failure to make available to inmates legal material pertaining to AEDPA, i.e., a copy of the statute itself, where the absence of
that material prevented the petitioner from learning of the one-year
58
statute of limitations. On the other hand, even in a capital case, errors attributed to post-conviction counsel, as opposed to a state or
government actor, do not constitute “impediments” under
59
§ 2244(d)(1)(B). In addition, the First Circuit has rejected an argument that the State’s withholding of exculpatory evidence in viola60
tion of Brady v. Maryland constitutes an impediment on the ground
that the petitioner could have obtained the same evidence elsewhere
61
prior to trial in the exercise of due diligence.
In light of the underdeveloped state of the law on the definition
of “impediment,” the lack of assistance of counsel may have a profound effect. That is, by exploring the many interstices of this procedural doctrine, a skilled advocate may succeed in securing a broader
definition from a particular court. In contrast, for the pro se litigant,
the doctrine will likely lie fallow and useless in his efforts to obtain
federal review of otherwise untimely filed habeas claims.

58

59

60
61

the inmate would be denied relief on the merits. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
(with two exceptions, prohibiting use of federal habeas (1) to enforce “new rule” of law
where rule was announced after the petitioner’s conviction became “final”; or (2) to establish a new rule or apply precedent in a novel manner that would create a “new rule);
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (limiting in relevant part relief on the merits to claims
where the decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by [the U.S. Supreme Court]).
E.g., Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also
Moore v. Battaglia, 476 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding for development of factual
record regarding claim that inadequate prison law library constituted a state-created impediment). But cf. Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting on causation
ground argument that inadequate library facilities or legal assistance qualified as impediment).
Compare Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t. of Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (basing conclusion on the lack of a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel), with Finch, 491
F.3d 424 (basing same conclusion on ground that counsel’s conduct does not constitute
“state action” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)) and Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th
Cir. 2005) (stating that incompetent assistance of counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings “is not the type of [s]tate impediment envisioned in § 2244(d)(1)(B)”).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6–8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting “petitioner had the power to
blunt the effect of any state-created impediment”).
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3. Necessary Efforts at Identifying Other Statute of Limitations Triggers
a. Newly Recognized Constitutional Right
AEDPA’s one-year period of time to file a federal petition is also
triggered anew under § 2244(d) when the Supreme Court recognizes
a new constitutional right that is made expressly retroactive to cases
62
on collateral review. It is an open question whether the Supreme
Court itself must determine retroactivity, or whether lower federal
63
courts are also authorized under AEDPA to do so. Every circuit to
consider the issue has concluded that lower federal courts, as well as
64
the Supreme Court, can make the retroactivity assessment. Again,
the fact that lower courts, at least for now, can determine whether a
newly recognized right should apply retroactively leaves ample room
for effective advocacy on the part of the petitioner. Thus, the unrepresented petitioner is at a distinct disadvantage in convincing a
court of relief from AEDPA’s timeliness bar based on a newly recognized constitutional right.
b. Discovery of Factual Predicate
The statute of limitations is also triggered under § 2244(d), regardless of the above events, on the date on which the petitioner
could have discovered the factual predicate for the claim or claims
65
raised in the petition in the exercise of due diligence. The language
of § 2244(d)(1)(D) is ambiguous as to whether the statute of limita66
tions applies to the petition or to independent claims.
Federal
courts appear to endorse the former interpretation, though will permit amendment of a pending petition to add a claim derived from
newly discovered facts that the inmate was unable to uncover through
67
due diligence at the time of filing. But the petitioner must make the
case for why he failed to discover the claim or claims earlier. Without
more, his pro se status, which encompasses the fact that he is incarce62
63
64

65
66
67

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2006).
1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.55.
See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004), aff’d on other grounds,
545 U.S. 353 (2005) (“every circuit to consider this issue has held that a court other than
the Supreme Court may make the retroactivity decision for purposes of § 2255(3)”); Ashley v. United States, 266 F.3d 671, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding lower federal courts
can make retroactivity determination); United States v. Lopez, 248 F.3d 427, 432–33 (5th
Cir. 2001) (same).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2006).
1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i] n.64.
Id. at § 5.2[b], 5.2[b][i] nn.52–55 (internal citations omitted).
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rated without outside legal and investigative assistance to uncover
68
facts that might support a claim for habeas relief, will not suffice.
Once again, federal courts engage in mythical thinking in assuming
that the average incarcerated inmate is as able to litigate and conduct
factual investigations as the professional attorney.
4. Unpacking the Doctrine of Statutory Tolling
Calculating the start date for the statute of limitations is only the
beginning of the pro se inmate’s daunting procedural challenge of
ensuring his federal petition is timely filed. The second major hurdle
in determining the actual filing deadline is accurately calculating the
effects of AEDPA’s doctrine of statutory tolling. As a nod to the principles of federalism that permeate federal habeas corpus and the accompanying requirement that inmates exhaust all federal claims in
69
state court, AEDPA provides that, regardless of the date on which
the statute of limitations starts to run, for inmates challenging state
convictions under § 2254, the clock will stop—i.e., AEDPA’s one-year
filing period is tolled—while “a properly filed application for state
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the perti70
nent judgment or claim is pending . . . .” But again, the statutory
language of § 2244(d)(2) raises at least as many questions as it answers. For example, what does “properly filed” mean? Does “or other collateral review” include federal habeas petitions? How should
federal courts interpret “with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim”? What does it mean to be “pending”? The federal judiciary
has devoted substantial energy since AEDPA’s enactment to each of
these issues. As a result, some rules are now clear through case law;
others remain uncertain. The pro se inmate must discern these
nuances and distinctions, with consequences potentially fatal to federal habeas review.

68

69
70

Rich v. Dep’t of Corr., 317 F. App’x 881, 883 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that pro se status
is not an extraordinary circumstance that entitled petitioner to tolling of the one-year
time limit); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that pro se
petitioner’s inability to calculate the limitations period correctly is not an extraordinary
circumstance and not allowing amendment to relate back to the date the original petition
was filed); United States v. Hale, Crim. No. 07-0385-WS-C, Civ. No. 09-0494-WS, 2010 WL
2105141, at *11 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (holding that pro se status was not extraordinary circumstance to allow petition to be amended after the filing deadline had passed).
See exhaustion discussion, infra Part I.D.1.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006).
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a. The Meaning of “Properly Filed”
For purposes of § 2244(d)(2), “an application is ‘properly filed’
when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings,” including, “for example, the
form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and
71
office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.”
Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded, at least insofar as state law
72
on timeliness is firmly established and consistently applied, an un73
timely state petition is not “properly filed.” Mundane as these assessments may be, the unrepresented habeas petitioner again confronts the task of identifying, understanding, and complying with
state law governing collateral review in order to qualify for AEDPA’s
statutory tolling. Absent assistance from a competent jailhouse lawyer
or law librarian, the process can stall here, with the inmate unable to
figure out how to “properly file” a state petition, a step that in turn is
essential to exhaust claims a petitioner seeks to raise in a federal petition.
b. Figuring Out What Qualifies for Statutory Tolling: The
Scope of “Or Other Collateral Review”
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that “application for [s]tate
post-conviction or other collateral review” does not contemplate fed74
eral habeas petitions. Rather, the Court held, the phrase refers only
to state applications and includes all state procedures available for re75
view of a criminal conviction. Thus, no tolling applies—i.e., the sta-

71
72

73
74
75

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][i][i] n.68 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005)) (noting that Pace’s holding “glossed over some complicating
factors that were not present in Pace” and that may require additional analysis on the part
of a reviewing federal habeas corpus court: situations in which (1) “the statute of limitations at issue is not a jurisdictional time bar, as was the time limit in Pace, but rather functions as an affirmative defense that can be waived” and (2) “there was no clear ‘state law’
on timeliness at the relevant stage of the proceedings because the timing rule to which
the state points—and upon which a state court ultimately relied in deeming a state postconviction petition to have been untimely—had not yet been announced or was not firmly established and consistently followed at the time the prisoner filed the state postconviction petition”); see also Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1128–29 (2011) (finding
California’s timeliness bar independent and consistently applied).
Pace, 544 U.S. at 412.
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001).
Id. at 176.
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tute of limitations continues to run—during the time in which a fed76
eral habeas petition is pending.
While the Court’s interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) makes sense as
an intellectual matter, due to the length of time federal courts take to
resolve federal petitions, the lack of tolling for federal petitions has
generated enormous headaches for pro se inmates attempting to
77
comply with the one-year statute of limitations. Even where a pro se
inmate manages to negotiate the myriad landmines of AEDPA’s statute of limitations and timely file his § 2254 petition, it is the rare case
in which the one-year period will not have expired by the time the
federal court has ruled on the petition. Thus, a petition dismissed
without prejudice to refiling for procedural reasons such as lack of
exhaustion may be forever barred on the merits simply because the
statute of limitations expired while the petition was pending before
78
the federal court. This reality hits pro se litigants particularly hard
for two reasons. First, it is axiomatic that such petitioners are more
likely to commit procedural missteps and hence, confront this scenario than those represented by counsel. Second, where a petition is at
least partially unexhausted, i.e., the inmate has not yet presented
each claim raised therein to the highest available state court of review, a district court will give the inmate the choice between dismissing the entire petition “without prejudice” or staying the exhausted
portion of the petition and holding it in abeyance while the inmate
79
returns to state court to finish exhausting. The court is not required,
however, to advise the inmate that if he opts to dismiss the petition in
its entirety, the “without prejudice” language is illusory in that any
76
77

78

79

Id. at 181.
See NANCY J. KING ET AL., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District
Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 42 (2007), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf [hereinafter Habeas Litigation Technical
Report] (noting that, as of 2006, federal habeas cases filed in 2002 and 2003 had been
pending for an average of 5.3 years for capital cases); Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 699, 709 (2007) (noting that, in 1989,
the average delay for a federal habeas corpus case was eight years; as of 2006, a California
inmate who filed a habeas appeal and had his sentence vacated by a federal court waited
an average of 16.75 years); Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through
the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
2101, 2131 (2002) (noting that in 1979 the average time from date of conviction to the
filing of a federal habeas petition was a year and a half; by 1995, the average time had increased to over five years).
The harshness of this consequence has spawned the “relation back” doctrine and, in
some cases, has provided a basis for equitable tolling. These doctrines will be addressed,
infra Parts I.C.5 and I.D.I.
E.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
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80

subsequent petition in fact will be time-barred. Hence, a pro se petitioner, well-intentioned but unschooled in AEDPA’s intricacies, is
more likely to opt for dismissal. He will do so with the misguided intention of refiling after exhausting the claims at issue without realizing that the statute of limitations has already expired and thus, any
future petition will be time-barred.
c. Interpreting “With Respect to the Pertinent Judgment or
Claim”
State attorneys have argued that § 2244(d)(2) should not apply if
the “[s]tate post-conviction or other collateral review” application did
not raise any federally cognizable claims or did not involve at least
81
one claim later raised in the § 2254 petition. Under this argument,
if a petitioner files a state petition only raising state claims or federally cognizable claims that he later abandons before filing for federal
habeas relief, no tolling under § 2244(d)(2) would apply. Given the
likelihood that, untolled, AEDPA’s statute of limitations would expire
while such state application is pending, such an interpretation would
likely be a death warrant for any future federal habeas review. To
avoid this consequence, a petitioner would have to anticipate and
contemplate the contours of federal habeas review even before filing
for any state collateral review. Not only might this limit the utility of
82
the state collateral review process, but again, the pro se litigant, less
able to identify all potential claims, state and federal, from the beginning and thus, more prone to piecemeal litigation, may find himself time-barred from federal review.
Thus far, every circuit court to address this issue has rejected the
state attorneys’ argument for such a strict interpretation of “pertinent
83
judgment or claim.” Rather, the federal appeals courts have held
80

81

82

83



Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (holding that federal district judges are not obligated
to warn petitioner that subsequently raised federal claims would be time-barred); Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a court is not obligated to inform petitioner of what he must do to invoke stay and abey procedure or that federal
claims would be time-barred when he returns to federal court).
Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); e.g., Ford v. Moore, 296
F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1002 (2003); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 (7th
Cir. 2001).
Arguably, a state petition for collateral review filed merely as a formality for exhaustion
purposes will not explore the parameters of relief under state law as fully as one focused
primarily on the state process.
See Cowherd, 380 F.3d at 913 (emphasis omitted) (overruling prior circuit precedent,
which had held that state post-conviction proceedings toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations
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that tolling applies regardless of the particular claims raised in the
state post-conviction petition as long as the state and federal petition
84
attack the same criminal judgment. But the Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the issue. Hence, the pro se litigant remains vulnerable
to a future Supreme Court ruling to the contrary.
d. Figuring Out the Meaning of “Pending”
Lastly, federal courts have grappled with the meaning of “pending” as used in § 2244(d)(2). What does it mean for a petition to be
pending in state court? Does this mean that in order to stop
AEDPA’s clock, a state petition must literally be pending before a
state court? Or does the word also contemplate the necessary time
gaps between filings in lower and appellate state courts? Again,
AEDPA, itself is silent on the issue.
In 2002, in Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court concluded as a
threshold matter that “the statutory word ‘pending’ . . . cover[s] the
time between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a [time85
ly] notice of appeal to a higher state court.” Thus, statutory tolling
applies during the intervals between a lower court’s denial of a state
petition and the filing of a timely appeal. But Saffold is a California
case, which complicates matters because that state uses a unique system of collateral review in which each court—trial, appellate, and supreme—has original jurisdiction to consider an inmate’s post86
conviction petition. Although in practice, most petitioners ascend
the courts as in other states, state law does not require that they do
so. And each petition an inmate files challenging a conviction is con-

84
85
86

only if they include a federal claim); see, e.g., Ford, 296 F.3d at 1040 (concluding that
AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled by a properly filed state post-conviction petition
attacking the same judgment challenged in the § 2254 petition regardless of whether the
state petition raises any federally cognizable claims); Sweger, 294 F.3d at 513–520 (holding
that AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during pendency of state post-conviction proceedings that challenge the same judgment as does the § 2254 petition, regardless of
overlap of claims raised in the respective petitions); Carter, 275 F.3d at 665 (holding that
“properly filed collateral challenge to the judgment tolls the time to seek federal collateral review,” regardless of overlap in claims between state and federal petitions).
See supra note 81.
536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002).
See id. at 221–23 (describing California’s collateral review system); Gaston v. Palmer, 417
F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging difficulty in applying tolling provisions to
the California habeas process because each of the three levels of state courts has original
jurisdiction in habeas proceedings); Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that a habeas petitioner is entitled to “one full round of collateral review” in the
state courts before the federal statute of limitations begins to run (internal citations omitted)).
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sidered “original,” rather than an appeal of a lower court’s denial.
Thus, it was unclear whether a petitioner was entitled to tolling under
§ 2244(d)(2) for the intervals that elapse between a state court’s
denial of one petition and the filing of a subsequent one in a higher
88
state court. The Court in Saffold concluded, albeit somewhat opaquely, that interval tolling does apply at least insofar as the petitioner
89
timely files his subsequent petition. But in so ruling, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he fact that California’s timeliness standard is
general rather than precise may make it more difficult for federal
courts to determine just when a review application (i.e., a filing in a
90
higher court) comes too late.” Indeed, the Court remanded the
case, in part, for the Ninth Circuit to consider whether a four-and-ahalf-month gap between petitions filed in the California Court of Ap91
peal and California Supreme Court rendered the latter untimely.
Four years later, in Evans v. Chavis, the Supreme Court again at92
tempted to clarify the tolling doctrine as applied in California. In
Evans, approximately three years had elapsed between the Court of
Appeal’s denial of a petition and the petitioner’s filing in the Cali93
fornia Supreme Court. The state supreme court denied the latter
94
petition without comment in a summary order. In concluding that
the collateral review application was “pending” during the three-year
period and thus, that the petitioner was entitled to tolling under
§ 2244(d)(2), the Ninth Circuit treated the denial “without comment
or citation” as a “decision on the merits,” rather than a dismissal as
95
untimely.
On review, the Supreme Court summarized its decision in Saffold
as holding:
(1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s [one]-year limitations period for
the time between the lower court’s adverse decision and the filing of a
notice of appeal in the higher court;
(2) in California, ‘unreasonable’ delays are not timely; and

87

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Each state court determines the timeliness of a petition based on an indeterminate “reasonableness” standard, rather than a notice of appeal. See Saffold, 536 U.S. at 221 (noting
differences between California’s collateral review system and that of typical “appeal”
states).
Id.
Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 226–27.
546 U.S. 189 (2006).
Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 195.
Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2004).
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(3) (most pertinently) a California Supreme Court order denying a petition ‘on the merits’ does not automatically indicate that the petition was
96
timely filed.

The Court observed that, for at least six months of the time
elapsed between petitions, petitioner had access to the prison law li97
brary to work on his petition. Additionally, the Court “found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that
California would consider an unjustified or unexplained [six]-month
98
filing delay ‘reasonable.’” The Court therefore concluded the petition was not “pending” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) during
the interval between denial of the Court of Appeal’s petition and pe99
titioner’s filing in the state supreme court. Thus, the Court reversed
and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.
In so doing, as in Saffold, the Court did not define “reasonableness”
with any precision, but instead deferred to state law and a petitioner’s
100
particular circumstances to inform that determination.
For the California litigant, the legal contours of statutory tolling
after Saffold and Evans are far from clear. In both cases, the Supreme
Court demurred on telling the lower courts—and hence, habeas petitioners—what exactly constitutes a reasonable interval between state
petitions to qualify for interval tolling under § 2244(d)(2). Thus, petitioners must make their best guess at how much is too much time to
take in preparing a subsequent petition. Where that guess is wrong,
such as in Saffold and Evans, the petitioner will be time-barred from
federal habeas review under AEDPA. As with the other intricacies of
procedural calculations under AEDPA, the pro se litigant is particularly vulnerable to this consequence as a result of simple miscalculation or simply requiring more time than deemed “reasonable” to investigate, research, and present habeas claims from behind bars.
Indeed, it is profoundly unfair to expect accuracy in calculation from
a pro se inmate on a topic that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Ninth Circuit has succeeded at clarifying.
There exists an additional aspect of statutory tolling calculation
that may prove particularly challenging to a pro se litigant in California: lower federal courts have applied statutory tolling to any second
or successive state post-conviction petition that is “properly filed” pur-

96
97
98
99
100

Chavis, 546 U.S. at 197.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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101

suant to state procedural law. But tolling is unavailable for the in102
tervals between successive rounds of state habeas petitions.
Again, California is the problem child, as federal courts have
struggled to identify the point at which one “round” of post103
conviction petitions ends and the next begins.
For example, because each court has original jurisdiction, a California petitioner can
file three consecutive petitions in superior court, two petitions in the
court of appeal, and a third in the state supreme court, and not nec104
essarily in ascending order. Or a petitioner can skip over the lower
105
courts altogether and file directly in the state supreme court. How
then to define the parameters of “one round” of habeas petitions?
The Ninth Circuit has attempted to do so by assessing the claims
raised in each individual petition to determine similarity or distinc106
tiveness.
But petitions involving overlapping claims—some repeat
107
and some new—defy easy categorization. If a pro se litigant wrongly assumes he is pursuing a continuous “round” of habeas petitions
and calculates his one-year period under AEDPA accordingly, he may
be ineligible for continuous tolling under § 2244(d)(2) and hence,
face dismissal of his § 2254 petition as time-barred.
5. Mining the Indeterminate Doctrine of Equitable Tolling
Yet another source of perplexity in calculating the time to file a
federal petition under AEDPA is the doctrine of equitable tolling.
This doctrine is a creature of common law, rather than the statute itself, with federal courts importing it from other statutory contexts.
101

102
103

104

105
106
107

See, e.g., Drew v. Dep’t. of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub
nom. Drew v. Crosby, 537 U.S. 1237 (2003); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th
Cir. 1999); Lovasz v. Vaugn, 134 F.3d 146, 148–49 (3d Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1040–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing the difficulty of determining whether an application for California habeas relief is “pending” within
the meaning of §2244(d)(2)).
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10; e.g., Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (2011) (noting that
where the superior court denies a petition, the petitioner can obtain review of the claims
raised therein only by filing a new petition in the court of appeal, confined to claims
raised in the initial petition).
Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1125.
Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1044–46 (9th Cir. 2005) (comparing claims in multiple
applications and granting tolling because some claims overlapped).
Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1081–84. (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a petitioner is not
entitled to tolling when he abandons all initial claims from a first application in a subsequent application); In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 770 (Cal. 1993) (“A successive petition presenting additional claims that could have been presented in an earlier attack on the
judgment is, of necessity, a delayed petition,” requiring a “persuasive reason for routinely
permitting consideration of the merits of such claims.”).
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Founded on principles of equity—that is, what is “fair” under particular circumstances—the doctrine is necessarily flexible and resists
108
ready categorization. Instead, courts inquire whether extraordinary
circumstances, apart from the inmate’s lack of due diligence, pre109
vented him from filing his petition on time. Courts define “due diligence,” in turn, as “reasonable diligence,” rather than “maximum
110
feasible diligence.”
Until very recently, a majority of the Supreme Court had not em111
braced the doctrine in the context of AEDPA. In Holland v. Florida,
however, decided in June 2010, the Court agreed with every circuit to
address the issue that the doctrine is in fact a viable one under
112
AEDPA. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must identify
an “extraordinary” circumstance that prevented his timely filing and
show that he exercised reasonable diligence despite that circums113
tance.
Both tasks require legal and analytical skills on the part of
the advocate.
Courts have endorsed equitable tolling where delay that prevents
114
timely filing results from judicial action or omission; certain actions
115
or omissions of petitioner’s counsel; the prisoner’s mental incom116
petence; and failure to provide petitioner notice of AEDPA’s filing
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

115

116

Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010).
Id. at 2553 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
Id. at 2565 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2560.
Id.
Id. at 2553.
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 234 (2004) (remanding to Ninth Circuit on the issue of
whether magistrate judge “affirmatively misled” petitioner, resulting in subsequent filing
of time-barred petition, thus warranting equitable tolling); Keenan v. Bagley, 400 F.3d
417, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2005) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on whether Ohio Supreme Court’s order extending state statute of limitations justified equitable tolling of
federal statute of limitations); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 710–11 (11th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam) (holding that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling where state supreme court sent notice of decision to the wrong person, thus denying petitioner timely
notice).
Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2008) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to decide whether petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because of egregious
conduct by counsel); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
petitioner entitled to equitable tolling because of counsel’s “sufficiently egregious” misconduct); Fonesca v. Hall, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that petitioner entitled to equitable tolling because of the “egregious . . . misconduct” of habeas
counsel).
Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for determination of
whether petitioner’s mental illness constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” which
would justify equitable tolling); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling was warranted because of petitioner’s
mental incompetency).
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deadline, either through adequate law library or legal assistance facil117
ities or court notification. But prior to Holland, lower courts generally assumed a lack of post-conviction counsel or post-conviction
counsel’s miscalculation of the statute of limitations does not provide
a basis for equitable tolling because such circumstance is not “extraordinary” given the lack of a constitutional right to post-conviction
118
counsel.
Indeed, in Holland, the majority seems to affirm this approach, acknowledging that “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, . . . such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a
119
filing deadline . . . does not warrant equitable tolling.”
But at the
same time, the Court observes that sufficiently egregious attorney error may qualify as an “extraordinary” circumstance justifying equita120
ble tolling.
Thus, the Court remanded the case to the Eleventh
121
Circuit for further findings and possible proceedings on the issue.

117

118

119
120

121

Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to
decide whether petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because of insufficient legal
resources in prison law library); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1028
(9th Cir. 2005) (finding equitable tolling appropriate where petitioner was not allowed
access to his legal files for eleven months); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921, 926 (9th
Cir. 2002) (remanding to determine if equitable tolling was warranted because petitioner
was deprived of access to his legal files for eighty-two days); Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d
508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000) (remanding to determine whether equitable tolling was warranted due to a four-month delay in notifying petitioner of denial of habeas petition).
Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding equitable tolling inappropriate even though counsel filed a state petition for post-conviction relief two months
after the federal deadline); Lovato v. Suthers, 42 F. App’x 400, 402 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding equitable tolling not warranted even when petitioner missed the filing deadline
because a public defender advised him to wait until after a proportionality review); Beery
v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding equitable tolling not warranted when
counsel took six months to inform petitioner that motion for appointment of postconviction counsel had been denied); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding equitable tolling unavailable for miscalculation by counsel of the limitations period); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding counsel’s
failure to understand the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA did not warrant
equitable tolling).
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
Id. (noting that counsel not only failed to file Holland’s petition on time and appeared
unaware of the deadline to do so—factors which, alone, “might suggest simple negligence”—but also failed to file on time despite Holland’s many letters emphasizing the
importance of doing so; counsel failed to research the proper filing date despite Holland’s letters identifying the correct authority for determining that date; counsel also
failed to inform Holland in a timely manner that the Florida Supreme Court had denied
his petition, thus retriggering AEDPA’s one-year clock with twelve days remaining, despite
Holland’s repeated requests for this information; and failed to communicate with Holland over a period of years, despite Holland’s repeated attempts to do so).
Id. at 2565 (noting that the Eleventh Circuit erroneously concluded equitable tolling was
per se inapplicable based on attorney error and the district court erroneously concluded
that Holland had failed to exercise due diligence).
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This decision opens the door to further litigation regarding the
effect of attorney error—or perhaps even the denial of counsel altogether in an unusually complicated case—on the availability of equitable tolling in a particular case. Again, these are arguments that a
typical pro se inmate is ill-equipped to make on his own behalf, but
that could ultimately make the difference between dismissal of a petition as untimely and judicial review on the merits.
Due—or reasonable—diligence, on the other hand, at least until
Holland, requires more than identifying an objective circumstance
that impeded a pro se litigant’s preparation of his federal petition.
For example, some courts have held that a potentially extraordinary
circumstance—such as a six-week prison lockdown that precludes law
library access—that arises at the start of the one-year limitations period
does not justify tolling because a diligent petitioner still has an op122
portunity to make up for the lost time.
By contrast, the same sixweek lockdown that occurs one month before the filing deadline may
123
justify six weeks of equitable tolling.
Thus, again, a pro se inmate
seeking equitable tolling based on a circumstance beyond his control
must take care to demonstrate adequate causation, which is an inherently legal showing and one he may be hard-pressed to plead sufficiently without assistance of counsel. Again, the consequence of failing to plead adequately will be dismissal of a petition as untimely,
regardless of the merits of the claims raised therein.
D. The Delicate Interplay Between AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations and Other
Procedural Doctrines
The complexity of calculating AEDPA’s statute of limitations multiplies exponentially in light of other procedural requirements under
the statute. For the typical pro se inmate, the interplay between these
procedural doctrines can convert an otherwise herculean task to a lit122

123

See, e.g., Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 67, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
equitable tolling unavailable for a petitioner who spent twenty-two days in solitary confinement and without access to legal materials at outset of the one-year limitations period); Pfeil v. Everett, 9 F. App’x 973, 979–80 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding equitable tolling
not warranted for lockdown because petitioner had eight months after the lockdown
ended to pursue his claims). But cf. Giraldes v. Ramirez-Palmer, No. C98-2757SI(PR),
1998 WL 775085, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding a lockdown over eleven months into a
petitioner’s one-year deadline did not warrant equitable tolling because petitioner had
time prior to the lockdown to work on his petition).
United States ex rel. Strong v. Hulick, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1038–40 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(finding equitable tolling warranted because petitioner was incorrectly informed of deadline, was in lockdown for fifteen of the twenty-three weeks immediately preceding his filing deadline, and was not given priority access to the law library when lockdown ended).
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erally impossible one. The primary culprits are the exhaustion requirement, prohibition on second or successive petitions, and, to a
lesser extent, the procedural default doctrine.
1. The Exhaustion Requirement
The exhaustion requirement, which is founded on principles of
federalism, requires state inmates to present each habeas claim to the
highest state court before filing in federal court. The doctrine pre124
dates AEDPA and AEDPA did little to change it. But AEDPA’s statute of limitations significantly complicates the potential consequences of the exhaustion requirement. Some problems are simply a
matter of statutory mechanics. Under the pre-AEDPA decision in
125
Rose v. Lundy, federal courts were required to dismiss “without prejudice” a mixed petition, i.e., one that contains both exhausted and
unexhausted claims. In theory, the petitioner then would be able to
return to state court to finish exhausting the claims and, then, assum126
ing the state court provides no relief, re-file the federal petition.
The dilemma, post-AEDPA is that, as discussed, the statute of limitations is not tolled during the period of time in which a federal peti127
tion is pending in federal court. Thus, by the time a district court
decides to dismiss a petition as mixed under Rose v. Lundy because
some of the claims are unexhausted, or as entirely unexhausted, the
statute of limitations often has run. As a result, the petitioner will be
time-barred from re-filing the federal petition after exhausting all of
the claims. In Rhines v. Weber, the Supreme Court noted:

124

125
126

127

Post-AEDPA, if a federal habeas petition contains an unexhausted claim that the court
would otherwise be required to dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court may nonetheless
deny the petition on the merits if it determines the claim has no merit. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(2) (2006). The court’s authority to consider an unexhausted claim is also subject to an express waiver by the state of the exhaustion requirement. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(3).
455 U.S. 509 (1982).
Id. at 510; see Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2005) (“[Lundy] imposed a requirement of ‘total exhaustion’ and directed federal courts to effectuate that requirement by dismissing mixed petitions without prejudice and allowing petitioners to return
to state court to present the unexhausted claims to that court in the first instance. . . . [P]etitioners who returned to state court to exhaust their previously unexhausted claims could come back to federal court to present their perfected petitions with
relative ease. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000) (dismissal without prejudice
under Lundy ‘contemplated that the prisoner could return to federal court after the requisite exhaustion’).”); 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at § 5.2[b][v] n.97.
See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001) (holding that the statute of limitations
was not tolled while petitioner’s first § 2254 petition was pending).
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The problem is not limited to petitioners who file close to the AEDPA
deadline. Even a petitioner who files early will have no way of controlling
when the district court will resolve the question of exhaustion. Thus,
whether a petitioner ever receives federal review of his claims may turn
128
on which district court happens to hear his case.

In attempt to address this dilemma, the Court in Rhines unanim129
ously embraced a stay-and-abeyance procedure. This procedure allows the district court to stay a mixed petition and hold it in abeyance
130
while the petitioner returns to state court to finish exhausting.
Once the petitioner has finished exhausting his claims in state court,
131
the district court will lift the stay and consider the entire petition.
But, while the district court has discretion to give a petitioner the option to stay and hold in abeyance his petition before dismissing it, the
court is under no obligation to advise the petitioner that a failure to
accept its stay-and-abeyance offer will likely foreclose later habeas re132
view on timeliness grounds.
Tellingly, the Supreme Court concluded it unfair to impose the burden of making that difficult deter133
mination on the district court.
Thus, a petitioner may opt to
dismiss the petition in its entirety without realizing that, in so doing,
he is forever closing the courthouse doors on himself. The pro se petitioner, unschooled in the complexities of the statute of limitations
mechanics, is particularly vulnerable to such poor decision making.
Nor does the stay-and-abeyance procedure offer any relief to a petitioner who has filed an entirely unexhausted, rather than mixed,
134
petition. In that case, the district court has no choice but to dismiss
the petition in its entirety, regardless of whether the petitioner will
135
subsequently be time-barred from re-filing.
Thus, the pro se peti128
129
130
131
132

133

134

135

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275.
Id. at 277–79.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 275–76.
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (holding that federal district judges are not obligated to warn petitioner that federal claims would be time-barred); Brambles v. Duncan,
412 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a court is not obligated to inform petitioner of what he must do to invoke stay-and-abey procedure or that federal claims would
be time-barred when he returns to federal court).
See Pliler, 542 U.S. at 232 (explaining refusal to “force upon district judges the potentially
burdensome, time-consuming, and fact intensive task” of determining whether limitations
period has run).
See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that district judges
have discretion to grant a stay-and-abeyance while unexhausted claims are exhausted, but
declining to extend Rhines to situations where the petition contains only unexhausted
claims, even where there may be exhausted claims that could be added); Jiminez v. Rice,
276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of petition on ground that it contained only unexhausted claims).
Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 481.
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tioner unfamiliar with the exhaustion requirement who acts diligently
in filing a timely federal petition will be barred from federal review
because the statute of limitations will have expired. AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision for state collateral proceedings, discussed supra,
will be useless to him because it is impossible to toll an already136
expired limitations period.
The statute of limitations complicates the exhaustion requirement
for the pro se litigant in yet another manner, one for which the Supreme Court has not attempted to craft a remedy. As discussed,
AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision set forth under § 2244(d)(1)
stops the one-year clock while the petitioner is exhausting potential
federal claims, i.e., while state post-conviction petitions are pending.
But the statute of limitations is not tolled until the petitioner actually
files a state petition. The clock will continue to run during the time
in which the petitioner is researching and preparing that petition. A
problem arises in states that provide inmates with more than one year
137
to seek post-conviction relief.
Unless the inmate is sophisticated
enough to realize at the threshold of his incarceration both that (1)
the federal deadline is one-year from the date the conviction becomes final; and (2) that time period will continue to run until the
inmate files a state post-conviction petition, despite acting diligently
and timely filing under state law, he will still unwittingly miss
AEDPA’s deadline.
Self-described “jailhouse lawyer” Thomas
O’Bryant, who authored a symposium piece for the Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Journal in 2006 that powerfully describes
his own experience missing the AEDPA deadline and the virtual impossibility of filing a timely federal petition from within the Florida
Department of Corrections, writes:
[P]risoners begin preparing for state post-conviction remedies under
the mistaken belief that they may use the entire two-year period [allotted
under Florida state law] before filing their post-conviction motion in the
state court without missing any important deadlines.
I have been asked many times by prisoners who are out of time for
seeking federal habeas review, “How can I have only one year to file a
federal habeas corpus when I can’t file it until after I finish my state re-

136
137

See supra Part I.C.4.
See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850 (instructing that post-conviction motions are first filed in
trial court, within two years of the date the conviction becomes final); N.J. RULE 3:2212(a)(1) (“no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than five years after the
date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. P. § 7-103(b) (West, Westlaw through ch. 1 & 2 of the
2012 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (petitions must be filed within ten years of the sentence imposition).
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medies, and I have two years to file state post-conviction motions?
Should my federal time not begin after I finish with my state postconviction remedies?” Such a situation does not seem logical, but it is
138
the situation.

2. AEDPA’s Proscription on Second or Successive Petitions
A federal petition that attacks the same criminal judgment as a
prior petition attacked and that the district court decided on the merits, rather than procedural grounds, is considered “second or succes139
sive.” Before AEDPA’s enactment, federal courts assessed second or
successive petitions in two ways. If the successive petition raised
claims distinct from those presented in the first petition and the State
objected that the petition was an “abuse of the writ,” the inmate had
to show “cause” for not raising the claim in the previous petition and
that he would suffer “prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of jus140
tice” if the court declined to review the claim.
If, on the other
hand, the petitioner sought to raise a claim brought in a previous petition that the court had decided on the merits, the court would consider the claim only where the inmate demonstrated “cause and pre141
judice” and the “ends of justice” so warranted.
But federal courts
applied the same cause-and-prejudice exception that applied to new
claims analysis.
AEDPA implemented significant changes to both the governing
procedures and substantive standards for second or successive petitions. In so doing, the revised statute dramatically restricted a petitioner’s ability to file such a petition. First, the statute entirely prohibits filing a successive petition containing the same claims as
presented in the initial petition. Procedurally, a petitioner seeking to
file a second or successive petition that presents new claims beyond
those raised in the first petition must first obtain authorization from a
three-judge circuit panel by showing that the petition satisfies
142
AEDPA’s substantive criteria. The court of appeals must act on the
application for authorization within thirty days and its decision is not

138
139
140
141
142

Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 333 (2006).
2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at § 28.3[b].
See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494–95 (1991); 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at
§ 28.3[a].
See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (citation and emphasis omitted); 2 HERTZ
& LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at § 28.2[b].
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)–(C) (2006).
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appealable, i.e., cannot be the basis for a petition for rehearing or pe143
tition for certiorari.
Substantively, AEDPA’s standards for issuance of an order authorizing a second or successive petition are very high. The petitioner
must show either:
(A) . . . that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense [i.e., ac144
tual innocence].

By significantly restricting the availability of successive petitions,
AEDPA puts substantial pressure on the petitioner to include all viable claims in the initial petition to ensure federal judicial review.
This task is a daunting one in light of the one-year time period within
which the petitioner must file. Prior to AEDPA, a petitioner was able
to file an initial petition containing claims that he litigated on direct
appeal—i.e., claims that required only copying from one pleading to
another—but then take the time needed to investigate and develop
new claims that required expansion of the factual record. PostAEDPA, such petitioner must make the tactical decision whether to
file the petition quickly, with hopes to amend it before the court rules
on it, to add additional claims, or take the extra time required to
prepare the additional claims and hope still to comply with the statute of limitations strictures. Or the petitioner could knowingly file a
mixed petition and then avail himself of the stay-and-abeyance
145
process described, supra. Again, expecting this level of legal sophistication from the average pro se litigant is naïve at best.
3. Procedural Default
The doctrine of procedural default also predates AEDPA and was
unchanged by the statute: If a claim raised in a federal petition is exhausted, but the state court denied it on an independent and adequate procedural ground rather than its merits, the federal court will
dismiss it as procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and
143
144
145

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)–(E) (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006).
See text accompanying notes 126–129.
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146

prejudice or actual innocence.
If the petitioner did not properly
exhaust the claim but is now procedurally barred under state law
from doing so, the claim is also considered procedurally defaulted
and will be dismissed with prejudice, again, absent a showing of cause
147
and prejudice or actual innocence.
But a federal court will not
honor a state procedural rule unless it is considered “independent of
148
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”
To
be “independent,” a state rule cannot be interwoven with federal
149
law. To be “adequate,” the rule must have been firmly established
and consistently applied at the time it was invoked by the state
150
court.
State rules that are too inconsistently or arbitrarily applied to bar federal
review “generally fall into two categories: (1) rules that have been selectively applied to bar the claims of certain litigants . . . and (2) rules that
are so unsettled due to ambiguous or changing state authority that apply151
ing them to bar a litigant’s claim is unfair.”

Assessment of whether a state procedural rule is independent and
adequate is often very involved and the governing principles far from
152
clear.
Again, for the average pro se habeas petitioner, the challenge of understanding this doctrine and effectively countering
claims of default, all within the one year allotted by the AEDPA, is an
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible one.

146

147

148

149
150
151
152

See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (finding petitioner’s claims procedurally
barred from federal review due to late filing of state habeas appeal); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (“Where a defendant has procedurally
defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas
only if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that
he is ‘actually innocent.’” (internal citations omitted)).
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729; see also Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1126–27 (2011) (finding that California’s time rule requiring state habeas petitioners to file known claims “as
promptly as the circumstances allow” as applied constitutes an independent state ground
that is adequate to bar habeas relief in federal court); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74
(1985) (noting that “the state court’s judgment does not rest on an independent state
ground”).
Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1127; Ake, 470 U.S. at 75.
Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1127; Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991); Valerio v. Crawford,
306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d
373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)).
See, e.g., Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1127–31 (concluding California’s timeliness bar was independent and adequate as applied and thus, a basis for procedural default of claims litigant sought to raise in federal petition).

1252

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:5

E. The Prototypical Inmate
The procedural complexity of AEDPA litigation, daunting for any
layperson, is all the more impenetrable for many pro se litigants in
light of the high rates of illiteracy and mental health problems that
plague American prison and jail populations. The Supreme Court,
itself, has taken as axiomatic the fact that the inmate population suffers from disproportionately high rates of illiteracy and mental health
153
problems. Empirical data bears out this assumption.
The Department of Education’s most recent study of inmate literacy rates, based on data collected in 2003, measured three types of
154
literacy: prose, document, and quantitative literacy.
“Prose literacy” describes “[t]he knowledge and skills needed to search, comprehend, and use information from continuous texts[, which would] include editorials, news stories, brochures, and instructional
155
materials.” “Document literacy” reflects “[t]he knowledge and skills
needed to search, comprehend, and use information from noncontinuous texts [and would] include job applications, payroll forms,
156
transportation schedules, maps, tables, and drug or food labels.”
Lastly, “quantitative literacy” encompasses “[t]he knowledge and
skills needed to identify and perform computations using numbers
that are embedded in printed materials[, such as] balancing a checkbook, computing a tip, completing an order form, or determining
157
the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement.
There
were four categories of literacy: below basic, basic, intermediate, and
158
proficient.
The report did not explicitly evaluate the ability of an inmate to
read and comprehend complex legal documents, statutes, or case
law, let alone to understand the intricacies of federal habeas filing
153
154

155
156
157
158

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 496–97
(1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See Elizabeth Greenberg, Eric Dunleavy & Mark Kutner, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Literacy Behind Bars: Results from the 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy Prison Survey, at
iv (2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/ 2007473.pdf.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. “Below Basic” reflects “an adult [who] has no more than the most simple and concrete literacy skills.” “Basic” means “that an adult has the skills necessary to perform simple and everyday literacy activities.” “Intermediate” indicates that an adult is able “to perform moderately challenging literacy activities.” “Proficient” signifies “that an adult has
the skills necessary to perform more complex and challenging literacy activities. The separate category, “nonliterate in English,” applies to individuals unable to complete a minimum number of basic literacy questions or unable to communicate in English or Spanish. Id.
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requirements. But based on the above definitions, such ability would
implicate primarily prose and, to a lesser extent, quantitative and
document literacy skills. Moreover, comprehending and effectively
wielding federal habeas corpus doctrine would require, at minimum,
a proficient level of literacy. The results from the study suggest very
few individuals behind bars would possess this capacity in that only
2% showed proficient levels of document and quantitative literacy
159
and 3% tested proficient in prose literacy.
For the remainder of
inmates, even assuming sufficient access to an up-to-date prison law
160
library, legal materials pertaining to habeas corpus practice lie far
beyond the reasonable comprehension of those who need to understand it most: inmates who are required to function as their own legal counsel in pursuit of the writ.
Statistics regarding the relative mental health of the inmate population in the United States are similarly bleak. A study released by the
Department of Justice in 2006 indicated that more than half of all in161
dividuals incarcerated in this country suffer from mental illness.
More specifically, more than two-fifths (43%) of state prisoners and
162
more than half (54%) of jail inmates reported symptoms of mania.
Approximately 23% of state inmates and 30% of those in jail reported

159

160

161

162

Id. at 13. Forty-one percent had intermediate prose literacy, with 56% at basic or below
basic. Forty-eight percent tested at intermediate document literacy, with 50% showing
basic or below basic. And only 20% revealed intermediate quantitative literacy, while
78% tested at basic or below basic. The study also excludes altogether persons unable to
communicate in English or Spanish and those with cognitive or mental disabilities that
prevented literacy testing. Thus, the results may overstate the overall inmate literacy
rates. Id.
See Benjamin R. Dryden, Comment, Technological Leaps and Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation in the Internet Age, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 830–31 (2008) (arguing that constitutional right of access to courts requires internet access for legal research, in so doing citing states’ dramatic cuts to prison law libraries post-Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 341 (1996),
and lack of internet access in all such libraries); O’Bryant, supra note 138, at 319–32 (describing severely limited legal resources available to pro se inmates in Florida, including
prison library law clerks generally equipped only with a high school diploma, a GED, or
functional literacy and thirty hours of legal training; jailhouse lawyers who are prohibited
from, and punished for, possessing other inmates’ legal papers; the virtual absence of
computers for inmate research; and actual library access limited to once a week).
See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS
OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/mhppji.pdf. Mental health problems were defined by either a recent history or
symptoms of mental illness within the twelve months prior to the study, which was conducted in mid-2005. But inmates in mental hospitals or who were otherwise physically or
mentally unable to complete the study surveys were excluded. Thus, again, the above statistics likely under-represent the actual levels of mental illness in prisons and jails. Id. at
2.
Id. at 1.
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163

symptoms of major depression. Insomnia or hypersomnia and persistent anger were the most commonly reported episodes amongst
those reporting major depression or mania, with nearly half of jail
164
inmates reporting such symptoms. About 15% of state inmates and
165
24% of jail inmates reported symptoms of a psychotic disorder.
About 74% of state inmates and 76% of those in jail with a mental
health condition also met criteria for substance dependence or
166
abuse.
Thus, even in the rare event that an inmate is sufficiently
equipped educationally to read and understand habeas doctrine, his
ability to do so may be profoundly impaired by mental illness.
F. The Impact of AEDPA on the Number of Federal Habeas Petitions Being
Dismissed on Procedural Grounds, and Thus Failing to Reach Merits
Review
Empirical study confirms that, since AEDPA’s enactment, for non167
capital litigants the Great Writ has lost much of its muscle. A 2007
study conducted at Vanderbilt School of Law (“the Vanderbilt study”)
revealed that federal habeas petitioners lacked assistance of counsel
168
in 92.3% of non-capital cases.
Moreover, under AEDPA, district
courts have dismissed as untimely 22% of non-capital federal habeas
169
170
petitions. Of the time-barred petitioners, only 5.1% had counsel.
By contrast, only 4% of capital cases, where habeas petitioners have a
statutory right to assistance of counsel and, thus, are not required to
navigate AEDPA’s procedural requirements alone, were dismissed as
171
time-barred.
The rates of non-capital petition dismissal as successive (7%) or individual claim dismissal as procedurally defaulted
172
But as with the time(13%) approximate pre-AEDPA practice.
163
164
165

166
167
168
169
170
171

172



Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. A psychotic disorder is shown by signs of delusions or hallucinations during the prior
year. Id. Delusions are indicated by the inmates’ belief that other people were controlling their brain or thoughts, could read their mind, or were spying on them. Id. Hallucinations included reports of seeing things or hearing voices that others did not. Id.
Id. at 6.
See Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 77, at 8–9.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 62 (noting “[t]he greater frequency of time-barred cases for non-capital prisoners is
expected given that unlike death row inmates in most states, non-capital habeas filers navigate the post-conviction process and its deadlines without counsel”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261.
NANCY J. KING ET AL., Executive Summary to the Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State
Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 6 (2007),
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barred cases, the dismissal rate on successive and default grounds in
non-capital cases, where petitioners are largely uncounseled, is much
173
higher than in capital cases. Finally, with respect to the effect of assistance of counsel, the report found that the presence of counsel
added 11%–49% more time to habeas proceedings than in cases
174
where the petitioner lacked counsel.
The presence of counsel re175
duces the likelihood of early termination of habeas cases, which typically arises with procedural dismissals.
This data illustrates the devastating effect that the statute of limitations, combined with other procedural doctrines, has had on the
pro se litigant’s ability to obtain federal court review of the merits of
176
claims raised in habeas proceedings. More than one in five litigants
177
are unable to file within AEDPA’s designated one-year time period.
It is unclear what portion of these cases involve litigants who simply

173

174
175
176

177

available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf [hereinafter Executive
Summary to the Habeas Litigation Technical Report]; Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 77, at 58. Because the study focused only on district court rulings, its authors acknowledge that the calculated rate of petition dismissal as successive may understate the actual dismissal rate in light of the gatekeeping role the court of appeals now play
under AEDPA in authorizing the filing of successive petitions. Id. The report indicates
that the cases involving at least one procedurally defaulted claim are also underreported
because in some cases where the court had alternative bases for denying the petition, it
would rule on the merits first, and statute of limitations second, and thus never address
the procedural default issue. Id.
Executive Summary to the Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 172, at 6. The
study indicates all claims were dismissed as unexhausted in over 10% of non-capital cases,
as compared to less than 4% of capital cases. Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra
note 77, at 62. Stays for exhaustion occurred seven times as often in capital cases than in
non-capital cases. Id. Procedural default, however, was invoked as the basis for dismissing a claim four times as often in capital as in non-capital cases. Id. Interestingly, postAEDPA, fewer courts are dismissing petitions on exhaustion grounds. Id. at 57 (reporting
that, prior to AEDPA, more than half of all claims raised in non-capital cases were dismissed without prejudice due to the petitioner’s failure to exhaust in state court; postAEDPA, 11% of non-capital cases involve dismissal of claims as unexhausted). This decrease may be attributable to an increasing awareness of the need to exhaust claims—a
relatively straightforward requirement that does not involve the complex calculations of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations—and, to a lesser extent, district courts’ post-AEDPA ability
to stay and hold in abeyance the exhausted claims in a mixed petition, while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust the remaining claims. See id. at 57–58 (reporting that
district courts stayed cases to allow a petitioner to exhaust unexhausted claims in only
2.5% of non-capital cases, and that these stays occurred in less than one-quarter of the
districts).
Id. at 73.
Id.
See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2009) (citing Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 77, as evidence that federal habeas review of state criminal judgments no longer
works).
Habeas Litigation Technical Report, supra note 77, at 46, 57.
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miss the deadline due to failure of calculation or those who are literally unable to file within the year allotted to them while also satisfying
AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement. Regardless, a substantial portion
of habeas petitions never clear the courthouse doors for substantive
review of the claims raised within them.
As a result of AEDPA’s dramatic effect on the efficacy of the Great
Writ for inmates seeking federal post-conviction review of their criminal judgments, some scholars have called for the abolition of federal
habeas corpus proceedings altogether, arguing that judicial resources
are better spent at the front end, providing defendants with compe178
tent trial and appellate counsel. But the dire state of implementation of Gideon’s mandate amplifies the critical need for providing
179
counsel in habeas corpus proceedings.
With trial and appellate
counsel stretched so thin, errors by even the most able and diligent of
counsel are inevitable. And the federal habeas remedy may be the
only chance the indigent inmate has at achieving the constitutional
mandate of effective assistance of counsel, albeit later in the process
than contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, even if the
judiciary had the resources and motivation to amply animate Gideon,
it is axiomatic that humans err. There will always be cases in which a
lawyer’s personal circumstances—physical or emotional issues or even
a temporary overextension within his or her caseload—will prevent
competent representation. Affected clients are entitled to a meaningful remedy. Recognition of a right to counsel based on access to
the courts would provide that remedy.
II. ACCESS-TO-THE-COURTS DOCTRINE
As discussed in the Introduction and Part I, this Article argues for
recognition of a limited right to counsel for habeas litigants to ensure
their constitutional right of access to the courts. Pre-AEDPA attempts
at convincing the Supreme Court to recognize a right to counsel of
any dimension in state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccess180
ful. But in light of the inordinate complexity AEDPA introduced to
178
179
180

See Hoffmann & King supra note 176, at 795 (advocating for abolition of federal review
and reallocation of resources to improve efficacy of trial court representation).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (rejecting argument that inmates
have a constitutional right to counsel during post-conviction review and thus, that procedures under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), apply to state-created right to
counsel on post-conviction review); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (noting,
in a plurality decision, that the holding of Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, extends to
capital cases in Virginia).
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federal habeas practice and the negative impact it has had on pro se
litigants, this Article urges a revisiting of that precedent to the extent
federal courts rely on it failing to embrace a right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. To do so first requires an overview of the contours of access-to-the-courts doctrine.
Justice Harlan once described the access doctrine as fundamental
to the rule of law in that the rule of law assumes that (1) the law will
be enforced; and (2) individuals who suffer wrongs under the law will
be able to have access to the appropriate forum, primarily courts, for
181
enforcement of the law. The access cases, either explicitly or implicitly, incorporate these two assumptions and address measures necessary to ensure that the indigent be able to get into court to enforce
their legal rights. The Supreme Court has recognized an inmate’s
constitutional right to gain access to the courts to litigate post182
conviction and civil rights proceedings.
The right of access derives from both equal protection and due
process jurisprudence, though the Court has not clearly articulated
183
the nature of this origin. The right itself emerged from both con181

182

183

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–75 (1971) (holding due process of law prohibited state from denying indigent access to court for divorce proceedings based on inability to pay court fees and costs); see also Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973)
(describing the right to access to the courts as “one of, perhaps the, fundamental right”).
See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that the right of access requires
prisons “to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers” by
providing inmates with adequate law libraries or assistance from those with legal training;
see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (noting that Bounds requires tools be provided to inmates to attack sentences, directly or collaterally, and to challenge conditions
of confinement).
See Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 11 n.6 (“The prisoner’s right of access has been described as a
consequence of the right to due process of law, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
419 (1974), and as an aspect of equal protection, see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
557 (1987).”). The Court invokes equal protection principles in evaluating whether state
laws or policies discriminate between the indigent and the financially able, see for example, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding that “to interpose any financial
consideration between an indigent prisoner of the [s]tate and his exercise of a state right
to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws”). But the
Court turns to the due process doctrine in assessing whether state action functions to
preclude an individual from seeking relief in a judicial forum, see for example, Procunier,
416 U.S. at 419 (declaring invalid “[r]egulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct
the availability of professional representation” as violating the corollary to “[t]he constitutional guarantee of due process of law . . . that prisoners be afforded access to the courts
in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights”). Often, challenged laws or policies necessarily implicate both doctrines. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1956) (holding that where states
provide for statutory right to appeal a criminal conviction, the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit erecting any financial barriers
that might prevent the indigent from appealing, e.g., requiring indigent to purchase trial
transcripts).
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stitutional challenges to procedural requirements that prevent inmates from pursuing post-conviction litigation as well as right to
184
Today, though still fairly ill-defined, the
counsel jurisprudence.
access right requires more than mere passivity on the states’ part. Rather, in certain circumstances the right requires states to take affirmative measures to ensure meaningful access to the indigent.
185
“[M]eaningful access to the courts is the touchstone” of the right.
The right has evolved in several stages.
A. Early Access Cases
The Supreme Court first invoked the access-to-the-courts doctrine
186
in 1941, in Ex parte Hull, to prohibit state action that directly obstructs a pro se inmate’s ability to file a post-conviction petition. In
Hull, the Court held unconstitutional a state prison regulation that
authorized prison officials to intercept inmate habeas corpus peti187
tions that were thought to be improperly prepared.
The Court
concluded:
[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to
apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a petition
for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn
and what allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone to
188
determine.

184

185
186
187
188

See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. at 371–383 (finding state fees and costs required to obtain a divorce violated indigent litigants’ constitutional right to access to the courts); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (invalidating Washington rules as applied that condition appeal on trial court’s conclusion that claims presented therein are nonfrivolous);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (invalidating Indiana Supreme Court rules that enable only a public defender, rather than indigent inmate seeking to proceed pro se, to obtain transcripts required in order to appeal from denial of writ of error coram nobis);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of counsel for noncapital criminal defendants); Smith, 365 U.S. 708 (invalidating Iowa law requiring payment of filing fee in order to file state habeas petition); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959) (invalidating Ohio procedure requiring payment of filing fee in order to seek discretionary review with state supreme court); Griffin, 351 U.S. 12 (invalidating state law
that required non-capital defendants to purchase their own trial transcripts for appeal as
violating Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process guarantees); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of counsel for capital defendants).
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
312 U.S. 546 (1941); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821–22 (recognizing Hull as the advent of
the access-to-the-courts doctrine).
Hull, 312 U.S. at 548–49.
Id. at 549.
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Almost thirty years later, the Supreme Court held that the access
right guarantees more than merely the literal right to file documents
189
in court. In Johnson v. Avery, the petitioner challenged a state prison regulation that barred inmates from assisting one another in
190
preparation of habeas petitions.
The Court held that, unless the
state or some other source provides legal help to indigent prisoners,
the court cannot indirectly obstruct access by preventing jailhouse law191
yers from preparing habeas petitions for other indigent prisoners.
The Court underscored that:
Since the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners
to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be
192
denied or obstructed.

Without the assistance of a jailhouse lawyer, the pro se habeas petitioner’s possibly valid constitutional claims would never reach a
193
The Court noted that the problem of
court for consideration.
access is particularly acute for the “high percentage of persons [in
jails and prisons] who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose edu194
cational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited.”
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas elaborated:
In a community where illiteracy and mental deficiency is notoriously
high, it is not enough to ask the prisoner to be his own lawyer. Without
the assistance of fellow prisoners, some meritorious claims would never
see the light of a courtroom. In cases where that assistance succeeds, it
speaks for itself. And even in cases where it fails, it may provide a neces195
sary medium of expression.

Following Avery, the Court in Younger v. Gilmore upheld in a twoparagraph per curiam opinion the lower court’s judgment requiring
California officials to provide indigent inmates with access to a rea196
sonably adequate law library for preparation of legal actions.
Several years later, the Court unanimously extended Avery to cover assis197
tance by fellow inmates in civil rights actions.
The Court rejected
the state’s attempt to distinguish the relative importance of civil
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 487 (quoting the district court opinion, Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784
(M.D. Tenn. 1966)).
Id.
Id. at 496–97 (Douglas, J., concurring).
404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam), aff’g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577–80 (1974).
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rights actions from habeas petitions, noting that “both actions serve
198
to protect basic constitutional rights.” The Court observed:
The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is
founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be
denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning
violations of fundamental constitutional rights. . . . The recognition by
this Court that prisoners have certain constitutional rights which can be
protected by civil rights actions would be diluted if inmates, often “totally
or functionally illiterate,” were unable to articulate their complaints to
199
the courts.

B. Right to Counsel Cases
As the jurisprudence regarding the access-to-the-courts right was
evolving, the Supreme Court also began to define the parameters of
the indigent criminal defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. The
right to counsel cases, though initially not analyzed in terms of access
to the courts, echoed the same concepts of fairness and access to justice as the access cases. Indeed, recognizing the similarity in constitutional underpinnings, the Supreme Court would eventually fold this
jurisprudence into its access-to-the-courts case law. Prior to this doctrinal merger, the right to counsel jurisprudence developed as follows.
1. Right to Counsel at Trial
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of
200
counsel for capital defendants.
In so holding, Justice Sutherland
observed that “[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of lit201
tle avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”
Rather, both the “intelligent and educated layman” and the “ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect” “require[] the guiding
202
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against [them].”
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment requires appointment of counsel at government expense for every indigent defendant in federal court who faces loss of
203
life or liberty, unless the defendant waives that right. In so holding,
198
199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 579.
Id.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 69.
304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).

Apr. 2012]

POST-AEDPA RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1261

the Court observed that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel
clause
[E]mbodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty,
wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the un204
trained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious.

Similarly, in extending Powell to non-capital defendants in Gideon v.
Wainright, the Court noted:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person [hauled] into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
205
truth.

2. Right to Counsel on Appeal
The right to counsel on direct appeal does not find its origin in
the Sixth Amendment. In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that, unlike the Sixth Amendment right to trial, a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to appeal his convic206
tion. Instead, the right to direct appellate review is entirely a crea207
Nonetheless, where states decide to provide for a
ture of statute.
statutory right to appeal, the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit imposing any finan208
cial barriers that might prevent the indigent from appealing.
In Griffin v. Illinois, petitioners challenged a state law that required
209
non-capital defendants to purchase their own trial transcripts.
In
finding the law violated due process and equal protection guarantees,
the Court noted that, once a state decides to provide for a right to

204
205
206

207
208
209

Id.
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 160–61 (2000) (finding no constitutional right to represent oneself on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)
(Black, J., plurality opinion); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894). But cf. McCoy
v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988) (“If a convicted defendant elects to
appeal, he retains the Sixth Amendment right to representation by competent counsel . . . .”).
Martinez, 528 U.S. at 160 (internal citation omitted).
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19 (Black, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 14. Illinois law required appellants who sought to raise non-constitutional errors to
pay for their own transcripts. Id. To the extent an appellant intended to allege constitutional errors, there was no charge. Id.
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appeal, it cannot do so in a way that discriminates against convicted
210
defendants who happen to be poor:
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded
as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to
211
buy transcripts.

After Griffin, the Court held other financial obstacles to direct appeal to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. These barriers included
a state law permitting only public defenders to obtain free transcripts
212
of a hearing on a coram nobis application, which thus denied indi213
gent appellants transcripts for appeal unless counsel ordered them;
a requirement that an indigent defendant satisfy the trial judge that
214
his appeal has merit before obtaining free transcripts; and filing
215
fees to process a state habeas petition or to seek review from the
216
state supreme court.
In 1963, the Supreme Court in Douglas v. California extended the
217
reasoning of Griffin and its progeny to hold that where a state provides for a right to appeal criminal convictions, the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses require the state also to provide the indi218
gent appellant with assistance of counsel. At issue in Douglas was a
California law that required appellate courts to make a threshold assessment of the merits of an appeal before deciding to appoint coun219
sel to assist a defendant on direct appeal.
The Court held that
when an indigent appellant must “run th[e] gantlet of a preliminary
showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair pro220
cedure.” In such a case,
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a pre210
211
212

213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
A writ of coram nobis, as authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006), permits
defendants to seek correction of purely factual errors in their cases but does not allow review of substantive legal issues. See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1914) (describing common law precedent for, and function of, writs of coram nobis).
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1963).
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494–95 (1963).
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708 (1961).
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 253 (1959).
The Court decided Draper, Douglas, and Lane on the same day. See Draper, 372 U.S. 487;
Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357–58.
Id. at 354–56.
Id. at 357.
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liminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for
himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a
221
meaningful appeal.

In 1974, the Supreme Court in Ross v. Moffitt declined to extend
222
In so holding, the Court emphaDouglas to discretionary appeals.
sized that an indigent appellant seeking the discretionary review of a
supreme court already has the benefit of attorney work-product from
the first appeal, which he need only duplicate with a request for high
223
court review.
Thus, although undoubtedly helpful, assistance of
224
counsel is not constitutionally required. The Court noted:
[The state’s constitutional duty] is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that
may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort
to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the
225
[s]tate’s appellate process.

The Court underscored, however, that states must “assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fair226
ly.”
At its core then, the right to counsel cases derive from a judicial
conviction that the courthouse doors will not close to judicial review
of claims raised by unrepresented inmates simply by virtue of the fact
that they lack the requisite legal skills to navigate the legal process.
Thus, where counsel is essential either to engage in trial advocacy or
to frame new claims on appeal, the right to counsel attaches.
C. Bridging Access-to-the-Courts and Right to Counsel Doctrines: Bounds v.
Smith
In 1977, the Supreme Court formally merged the early access-tothe-courts cases with its right to counsel jurisprudence to articulate
227
an access doctrine of broader application. In Bounds v. Smith, state
inmates filed civil suit against the State arguing their constitutional
right of access to the courts required the State to provide adequate
prison law library facilities or other legal assistance in habeas litiga228
tion. The Court agreed, holding that in some situations the access
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id. at 357–58.
417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id.
430 U.S. 817 (1977).
Id. at 818.
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right places an affirmative obligation on states to develop and implement “remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the
229
In so concluding,
courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.”
the Court invoked both early access-to-the-courts and right to counsel
230
precedent.
The Court identified the core of its prior decisions striking down
financial obstacles to the appellate process—including lack of counsel—as essential to ensure the indigent access to a meaningful appeal
231
from their convictions.
Justice Marshall, writing for the six-Justice
majority, rejected the State’s attempt to limit its reading of Johnson v.
232
233
Avery and Wolff v. McDonnell. Rather, the majority observed that at
issue in those cases was whether state policies prohibiting inmates
from assisting one another in preparing habeas and civil rights actions violated the access rights of “ignorant and illiterate” inmates
234
“without adequate justification.”
Because in both cases such inmates were unable to present their written claims to the courts, their
“constitutional right to help” required at minimum permitting assis235
tance from fellow, literate inmates.
The Court noted that Johnson
and Wolff “did not attempt to set forth the full breadth of the right of
236
access.”
Indeed, neither case precluded “requiring additional
229
230
231

232
233
234
235
236

Id. at 822.
Id. at 822–25.
See id. at 822–23 (citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959) (holding that indigent
inmates must be able to file appeals without payment of docket fees); Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198–99 (1971) (requiring state to provide transcript of non-felony
trial); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370–71 (1969) (ruling that a state is required
to provide transcript of habeas corpus hearing); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42–43
(1967) (holding that a state is required to provide transcript of preliminary hearing); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310–11 (1966) (finding unconstitutional a state requirement that prisoners reimburse the state for the cost of trial transcripts only if they are unsuccessful on appeal); Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194–95 (1966)
(mandating that a state provide transcript of post-conviction proceeding); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499–500 (1963) (ruling that trial transcript provision cannot
be conditioned on court approval); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1963) (deciding that a state officer cannot require public defender’s approval to obtain coram nobis
transcript); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (recognizing the right to
counsel on direct appeal); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713–14 (1961) (holding that
indigent inmates must be able to file habeas petitions without payment of docket fees);
Eskridge v. Wash. Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (ruling that trial transcript provision cannot be conditioned on court approval); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20
(1956) (concluding that state must supply trial records to indigent inmates seeking appellate review).
393 U.S. 483 (1969).
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823–24.
Id. at 823–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 824.
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measures to assure meaningful access to inmates able to present their
237
own cases.”
The Court further noted that it had long imposed affirmative obligations on states to guarantee meaningful court access to all in238
mates.
[T]he cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total
denial. . . . The inquiry is . . . whether law libraries or other forms of legal
assistance are needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to
239
the courts.

Justice Marshall observed that “it would verge on incompetence”
for an attorney to file an initial pleading without researching relevant
240
procedural and substantive law. And if a lawyer must perform such
241
tasks, so, too must the pro se inmate. Indeed, it is likely even more
important that the pro se litigant “set forth a nonfrivolous claim
242
meeting all procedural prerequisites” to avoid early dismissal.
Likewise, without an adequate library or legal assistance, the pro se
243
litigant is left defenseless to answer to the respondent’s pleadings.
The situation is particularly compelling in habeas proceedings, where
the petitioner often seeks to raise claims that trial or appellate counsel did not litigate and thus, has no legal work product off of which to
244
work.
But the Court emphasized that states have broad discretion in en245
suring constitutionally adequate access to the courts for inmates.
Providing a law library is but one means of doing so, and states are
246
encouraged to experiment with alternate approaches. The relevant
inquiry is what steps are necessary “to give prisoners a reasonably
adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental
247
constitutional rights to the courts.” Thus, the Court held: “[T]he
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires pris-

237
238

239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 824–25 (noting that it is “indisputable” that states must provide indigent inmates
with paper and pen, notary services, and adequate postage to prepare and file legal papers, forgo docket fees and pay for transcripts, and pay for assistance of trial and appellate counsel).
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id. at 825–26.
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id. at 827–28.
Id. at 830–31.
Id. at 830–32.
Id. at 825.
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on authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libra248
ries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”
In so holding, the Court dismissed as “irrelevant” the state practice of appointing counsel in post-conviction proceedings where the
petitioner’s claims survive initial judicial review. Rather, the core
concern underlying the access right is “protecting the ability of an
inmate to prepare a petition or complaint,” that is, securing a foot in
249
the courthouse door in the first place.
In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
accused the majority of creating “the ‘fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts’ . . . virtually out of whole cloth with little
or no reference to the Constitution from which it is supposed to be
250
derived.” Justice Rehnquist warned that “[i]f ‘meaningful access’ to
the courts is to include law libraries, there is no convincing reason
why it should not also include lawyers appointed at the expense of
251
the State.” “Just as a library may assist some inmates in filing papers
which contain more than the bare factual allegations of injustice,” the
dissent reasoned, “appointment of counsel would assure that the legal arguments advanced are made with some degree of sophistica252
tion.”
D. The Right of Access, Post-Bounds
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim in Pennsylvania v. Finley that the “equal protection guarantee of ‘meaningful
access’” requires assistance of counsel during state post-conviction
253
proceedings. In Finley, the petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition
in state trial court, raising the issues her appointed counsel had
254
raised on direct appeal to the state supreme court. The trial court
248
249
250
251
252
253

254

Id. at 828.
Id. at 828 n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 840 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 828).
Id. at 841.
Id.
481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987). More precisely, petitioner argued that, notwithstanding a lack
of a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, once the state appoints counsel, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires counsel’s actions to comport
with the Anders v. California procedures. Id. Anders in turn requires that appointed
counsel who seeks to withdraw based on a failure to identify any potentially meritorious
issues file an accompanying brief that identifies all ostensibly arguable issues. Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967). This process ensures judicial review of the merits of the appeal before deciding whether to grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and
thus, protects appellant’s constitutional right to counsel. Id.
Finley, 481 U.S. at 553.
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denied relief, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, ordering that petitioner receive assistance of counsel in her post-conviction
255
proceedings. After a review of the record, petitioner’s attorney informed the court that there were no arguable bases for relief and
256
thus, asked to be relieved as counsel.
The trial court agreed with
counsel’s assessment and granted the motion to withdraw from re257
presentation.
With new appointed counsel, petitioner appealed the trial court’s
258
The state appeals court held that prior counsel had
judgment.
been ineffective in moving to withdraw without briefing potential is259
sues as required by Anders v. California, and remanded for further
260
The Supreme Court reversed, finding Anders inapproceedings.
plicable because it derives from a constitutional right to counsel,
261
which does not exist in state post-conviction proceedings.
The
Court observed that “the right to appointed counsel extends to the
262
first appeal of right, and no further.”
Moreover, “the defendant’s
access to the trial record and the appellate briefs and opinions provided sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain meaningful access
to courts” for both discretionary appellate review and post-conviction
263
proceedings.
Two years after Finley, the Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion in Murray v. Giarratano, holding that petitioners in capital cases
do not have an access-to-the-courts right to counsel in state post264
conviction proceedings. In Giarratano, Virginia’s death row inmates
filed a civil rights suit arguing that assistance of counsel was required
in order “to enjoy their constitutional right to access to the courts in
pursuit of state habeas corpus relief,” as guaranteed by Bounds v.

255
256
257
258
259
260

261
262
263
264

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
386 U.S. 738, 742–45 (1967).
Finley, 481 U.S. at 554. Because the right to assistance of counsel encompasses the right
to effective assistance of counsel, when counsel renders ineffective assistance, the aggrieved
client is entitled to provision of a remedy. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
684–86 (1984) (recognizing ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a Sixth Amendment
violation); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (recognizing due process and equal
protection right to counsel on direct appeal requires effective assistance of counsel); see also Garcia Uhrig, supra note 15, at 559–63 (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine).
Finley, 481 U.S. at 559.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 557.
492 U.S. 1 (1989).
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265

Smith. State prison facilities in Virginia allowed death row inmates
restricted use of law libraries and appointed a number of staff attorneys to the various penal institutions to assist inmates with incarcera266
tion-related litigation.
The district court concluded that several special considerations
267
warranted greater assistance to inmates than outlined in Bounds.
Specifically, in light of their pending execution, death row inmates
have limited time within which to prepare post-conviction petitions,
their cases are exceptionally complex, and the psychological effect of
their death sentences impairs the ability to perform their own legal
268
work.
The Fourth Circuit, en banc, affirmed the district court’s
269
remedial order. In so holding, the appellate court concluded that
Pennsylvania v. Finley was not controlling because Finley was not a
“meaningful access” case, did not address the rule enunciated in
Bounds v. Smith, and, “most significantly,” was not a death penalty
270
case.
The Supreme Court reversed, affirming Finley, which, in disagreement with the Fourth Circuit, it characterized as in fact involving
meaningful access to the courts:
The Court of Appeals . . . relied on what it perceived as a tension between the rule in Finley and the implication of our decision in Bounds v.
Smith . . . ; we find no such tension. Whether the right of access at issue
in Bounds is primarily one of due process or equal protection, in either
271
case it rests on a constitutional theory considered in Finley.

Thus, the plurality observed that to interpret Bounds as requiring the
provision of assistance of counsel to capital inmates would require at
least partially overruling Finley based on the district court’s factual
272
conclusions regarding the unique nature of capital cases. Instead,
the Court extended Finley to capital inmates, in so doing noting that
273
its “holding necessarily imposes limits on Bounds.”
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, writing separately,
274
concurred in the judgment. As a threshold matter, he noted:
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of
the review process for prisoners sentenced to death. As Justice Stevens
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274

Id. at 3–4; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 3–6.
Id. at 4.
Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
Id.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 11 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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observes [in dissent], a substantial proportion of these prisoners succeed
in having their death sentences vacated in habeas corpus proceedings.
The complexity of our jurisprudence in this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for
275
collateral relief without the assistance of persons learned in the law.

But Justice Kennedy also underscored that states have considerable
discretion in implementing measures that secure meaningful access
276
to the courts for its inmates, as required by Bounds. And significantly, despite the lack of formal provision for appointment of counsel in
capital cases, “no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable
277
to obtain counsel to represent him in post-conviction proceedings.”
Additionally, Virginia’s penal institutions employ staff attorneys to as278
sist inmates with post-conviction pleadings.
Thus, Justice Kennedy
in his concurrence concluded that he was “not prepared to say that
279
this scheme violates the Constitution.”
Seven years after Giarratano, the Supreme Court modified Bounds
280
In Casey, Arizona state inmates brought a civil
in Lewis v. Casey.
rights action under Bounds v. Smith, challenging the adequacy of the
281
state’s prison law library and legal assistance program. The district
court granted injunctive relief on the ground that the prison system
failed to comply with the constitutional standards set forth under
282
Bounds.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bounds violation finding
283
and, for the most part, the terms of the injunction.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded due to the district
court’s “failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of
284
actual injury.” In so holding, the Court read into Bounds an actualinjury requirement. The Court emphasized that Bounds did not
“create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance” and thus, “an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury
simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance
285
program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Rather, the Court in
Lewis held that, to show a violation of the constitutional right to
access to the courts, an inmate must demonstrate that the prison’s al275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
518 U.S. 343 (1996).
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 351.

1270

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:5

leged deficient library or legal assistance resources “hindered his ef286
forts to pursue a legal claim.”
He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed
for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have
known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished
to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law
287
library that he was unable even to file a complaint.

The Court also modified Bounds’s apparent expansion of the right
of access recognized in earlier cases, “which was a right to bring to
288
court a grievance that the inmate wished to present.” Specifically,
the Court disclaimed Bounds’s suggestion that “the State must enable
the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in
289
court.”
The Court concluded: “To demand the conferral of such
sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed
largely illiterate prison population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution
290
requires.” In short, Lewis made clear that the access right is merely
the right to get a foot in the courthouse door, not a right to substan291
tive assistance with one’s case. At the same time, the right necessarily implicates a substantive component, which is inherent in the right
to have access to a law library or other legal assistance.
After Lewis, the precise parameters of the access-to-the-courts right
as applied to pro se habeas litigants remain imprecise. At a minimum, before enactment of AEDPA and its concomitant procedural
strictures, the Supreme Court had declined to hold that the access
292
right encompasses a right to assistance of counsel.
For death row
inmates, however, Justice Kennedy, with Justice O’Connor joining,
premised his vote on the fact that no Virginia death row inmate had
293
in fact been denied assistance of counsel. Hence, the issue is argu294
ably still an open one. Instead, the Court has adhered to a position
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294

Id.
Id.
Id. at 354 (citing Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 547–48 (1941); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
13–16 (1956); and Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489 (1969)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 14–15.
See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1081, 1089–91 (2006) (arguing that
“Giarratano has been seriously overread” in that “[t]he controlling opinion of Justice
Kennedy recognizes that capital post-conviction petitioners have a right to counsel in certain circumstances” in existence in current death penalty litigation).
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that the access right is an inherently flexible one, with states possessing broad discretion as to how to implement it. In Lewis, the Court
also underscored that the right encompasses only the ability to get
one’s foot in the courthouse door, rather than to discover and actually litigate claims in a petition.
But the dramatic change in federal habeas law brought by enactment of AEDPA in 1996 changed the relevant legal landscape and
now calls for re-examination of the issue. Even for non-capital inmates, AEDPA’s complex array of procedural requirements—in particular, the statute’s one-year statute of limitations and its interplay
with other procedural doctrine—have placed the Great Writ out of
reach for many pro se inmates. Absent repeal of AEDPA, this new
landscape, particularly as illuminated by the federal courts since
AEDPA’s enactment, necessitates recognition of a constitutional right
to assistance of counsel in deciphering the myriad filing requirements and thus, gaining access to federal court review.
III. THE ACCESS-TO-THE-COURTS DEMAND FOR COUNSEL IN POSTAEDPA LITIGATION
As discussed, the constitutional right of access to the courts for
habeas petitioners is still fairly amorphous in dimension. In the ab295
sence of assistance of counsel, the early cases, Johnson v. Avery and
296
Younger v. Gilmore, affirm the essential role of jailhouse lawyers
and/or adequate law libraries in ensuring access to the courts for indigent habeas petitioners. But after AEDPA, such alternate resources
no longer suffice to protect the indigent inmate’s right to access to
the courts. Fellow inmates self-taught in federal habeas corpus are
generally no match for the rigor and intricacies of AEDPA’s shifting
procedural demands. Nor will access to a prison law library without
legal assistance enable the average pro se inmate to gain adequate insight into AEDPA’s myriad procedural requirements in order to fend
297
for himself. As analyzed supra, AEDPA’s murkiest issues lie hidden
beneath the spare language of the statute itself and require extensive
research and analysis to excavate.
Likewise, the right to counsel jurisprudence, as merged with the
access right, should not control. This case law only considers the role
of counsel in researching and framing the substance of claims in discretionary appeals and state habeas proceedings. The Supreme
295
296
297

393 U.S. 483 (1969).
404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
See supra Part II.C–D.
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Court ultimately concluded that where inmates are simply repeating
claims previously developed and litigated with counsel’s assistance,
298
the Constitution does not demand assistance of counsel. But none
of this jurisprudence considers the barrier to access that AEDPA’s inordinate procedural complexity now poses to pro se litigants, separate and apart from the substance of the claims for which the inmate
seeks the writ of habeas corpus.
In Bounds v. Smith, the Court identified substantive content to the
access right, finding its core to be “protecting the ability of an inmate
299
to prepare a petition or complaint.” As discussed, with Lewis v. Casey, the Supreme Court retreated from this interpretation, holding
that “access” signifies only the right to get one’s foot in the courthouse door, rather than to possess full litigation capability once in300
side. The Court underscored the need for states to have flexibility
in implementing the right, withholding recognition of a right to
counsel to guarantee that access.
While such flexibility may have sufficed constitutionally to protect
Lewis’s more limited access right in the pre-AEDPA era, the dramatic
change to federal habeas practice that AEDPA wrought in 1996 now
demands conferral of a right to counsel to federal habeas litigants.
Indeed, the Court’s decision in Lewis contemplates the reality of postAEDPA habeas practice when it posits as an access violation the case
where the court dismisses a pro se litigant’s petition due to failure to
comply with a technical requirement that the litigant could not have
known about, or where the inmate is unable to file for relief alto301
gether as a result of inadequate legal resources.
In Lewis’s era,
these hypotheticals represented the anomalous case. But today, federal habeas practice epitomizes these examples in that AEDPA’s procedural complexity is all but incomprehensible to the average inmate,
regardless of the quality of the library facilities available to him. The
Vanderbilt study finding that 22% of non-capital petitions are dismissed on timeliness grounds alone, with another 7% dismissed as
successive and 13% of individual claims procedurally barred, bears
302
this out. A copy of the governing statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2253–
2254, and a set of federal case reporters, though perhaps sufficient in
pre-AEDPA practice, will not begin to unpack the intricacies of
298
299
300
301
302

See supra Part II.D. The Right of Access, Post-Bounds.
430 U.S. 817, 828 n.17 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974)).
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828 & n.17.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
See HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 77, at 57, 64.
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AEDPA’s myriad requirements for the average pro se inmate. Indeed, federal courts have devoted substantial energy over the past fifteen years to distilling the actual mechanics of AEDPA’s procedural
requirements, in particular, its statute of limitations. Notwithstanding the skill and experience of the federal bench, this process remains a daunting one and the doctrine is far from settled.
Without a lawyer, in sufficient time, an inmate might be able to articulate his core concerns—e.g., “my lawyer didn’t talk to my alibi
witness” or “the prosecutor didn’t give my lawyer all of the evidence,”—and the judge, with a law clerk at hand, could typically fig303
ure out the underlying constitutional issues presented.
But once
the procedural barricade of AEDPA was erected and pro se inmates
were required to navigate the intricacies of a short statute of limitations, together with the exhaustion and procedural default doctrines
and the new bar on successive petitions, the courthouse doors in effect slammed shut. Most inmates, while perhaps capable of inartfully
informing the court why they think they should not be behind bars,
are not capable of navigating a very complicated set of procedural
rules. For these inmates, AEDPA has erected an impenetrable barrier
to federal habeas review.
Nor does removal of restrictions on inmates helping one another
304
suffice, constitutionally. True, in time, some inmates might be able
to educate themselves to a point at which their knowledge rivals, if
305
not surpasses, professional counsel. But without systemic provision
303

304

305

Where the inmate can show prejudice, defense counsel’s failure to interview viable alibi
witnesses may violate the Sixth Amendment, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (setting forth test for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim); see, e.g., Griffin v. Warden, Md. Corr. Adjustment Ctr., 970 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir.
1992) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to interview alibi witnesses). The prosecutor’s failure to turn over to the defense potentially exculpatory evidence would violate the Due Process Clause. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91
(1963) (White, J., writing separately). Nonetheless, separate due process and equal protection concerns arguably dictate a right to counsel for claims raised in the first instance
in habeas corpus. See Garcia Uhrig, supra note 15, at 559–63 (articulating a substantive,
claims-based right to assistance of counsel in habeas corpus for claims raised in the first
instance in habeas proceedings).
See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (finding state prison regulation prohibiting inmate assistance in preparing state habeas petitions violates constitutional right to
denial of access to access-to-the-courts in absence of any alternative to such assistance).
See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010) (remanding for determination of
whether inmate entitled to equitable tolling of statute of limitations based on counsel’s
extraordinary incompetence where inmate, himself demonstrated enormous diligence in
attempting to file his petition on time despite counsel’s failures); O’Bryant, supra note
138, at 315 (illustrating sophisticated understanding of AEDPA’s procedural requirements, yet noting such understanding came too late to assist in his own case, which was
dismissed as time-barred for failure to file within the requisite one year).
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of competent legal assistance or a remedy for the lack thereof, too
many inmates will come up short, with little correlation in case outcome to the actual merits of their cases. Denial of counsel in modern
federal habeas practice is akin to denial of access to the jailhouse lawyer and/or an adequate prison law library in the pre-AEDPA world.
Lewis seems to hold that a petitioner can show an access violation
only after the fact and only where he was denied review of an arguably
306
valid claim. This would preclude relief for inmates who are unable
to identify potentially meritorious claims that they would have raised
in a procedurally barred habeas petition. It would also preclude any
injunctive relief or provision of counsel before dismissal of a habeas
petition. The Court has not shed additional light on this aspect of its
decision since Lewis. But such holding stands in direct conflict with
access-to-the-courts jurisprudence. As discussed, Bounds merged the
decisions that involved literal impediments to indigent filing—e.g.,
filing fees, prison official screening of petitions, and unavailability of
trial transcripts to pro se litigants—with right to counsel jurisprudence, all of which define the right of access as entirely independent
of the merits of the petitioner’s case. Rather, the essence of the right
is merely the ability to present one’s case before the judiciary, regardless of the ultimate outcome. Hence, to the extent Lewis requires
more, the decision should be overruled as at odds with decades of
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Regardless, after Lewis, it is clear that the right of access at most
means a right to assistance of counsel in clearing AEDPA’s procedural hurdles to federal habeas review. It does not contemplate assis307
tance of counsel in researching and framing those claims. Thus, a
right to post-conviction counsel based on access doctrine would extend only to penetrating the procedural thicket cultivated by AEDPA
and no farther.
There are a number of methods that could serve to fulfill this constitutional mandate. Specifically, federal courts could: (1) provide
counsel to assist indigent inmates in navigating AEDPA’s procedural
requirements and filing the petition within the provided one-year
time period as well as a remedy where attorney error causes dismissal
of a petition on procedural grounds; (2) where provision of counsel
306
307

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
Petitioners may find a constitutional right to counsel in researching, identifying, and litigating the substance of claims for which habeas corpus provides the first forum for review
based on distinct due process and equal protection considerations. See Garcia Uhrig, supra note 15, at 598–600 (articulating a substantive, claims-based right to assistance of
counsel in habeas corpus for claims raised in the first instance in habeas proceedings).

Apr. 2012]

POST-AEDPA RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1275

is impractical, simply provide a remedy to petitioners where they fail
to satisfy AEDPA’s myriad procedural requirements for reasons other
than lack of due diligence; (3) recognize ineffective assistance of
counsel or denial of counsel altogether as a basis for statutory or
equitable relief from AEDPA’s strictures; or (4) enact policy reforms
either to reduce the number of inmates pursuing the writ of habeas
corpus or to repeal AEDPA’s procedural requirements, in particular,
the one-year statute of limitations and rigid bar to successive petitions, altogether.
A. Providing Counsel
To implement an access right to counsel, the federal government
can invoke the ready structure of the federal public defenders’ offices
and/or federal panels for court-appointed counsel. Indeed, some
federal public defenders offices already staff attorneys competent in
AEDPA’s intricacies and pitfalls as a result of capital defense prac308
tice. As a matter of course, inmates whose convictions are affirmed
on direct appeal would receive consultation with counsel regarding
the post-conviction process. If an inmate indicates interest in pursuing post-conviction relief, counsel would advise him of the procedural requirements under AEDPA. Counsel would also advise state
inmates regarding the role state post-conviction proceedings play in
properly exhausting any claims presented in a federal petition and in
tolling AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In practice, implementation of
the right would mimic the constitutional right to counsel on direct
appeal, albeit counsel’s role would be a more limited one. Rather
than be tasked with preparing, filing, and litigating appellate briefs,
counsel’s role would be only to educate the inmate on AEDPA’s requirements to ensure that the inmate is not denied habeas review
based on failure to comprehend and navigate AEDPA’s procedural
requirements.

308

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (providing for right to counsel in federal postconviction proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2006) (requiring more stringent experience
criteria for counsel appointed in capital post-conviction proceedings than non-capital
proceedings).
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B. Providing a Remedy for Ineffective Assistance of Post-conviction Counsel
1. The Constitutional Requirement of Effective Assistance of Counsel
It is well-established that the constitutional rights to counsel at trial and on direct appeal guarantee rights to effective assistance of coun309
sel. Where counsel renders ineffective assistance, a defendant may
seek relief, usually in post-conviction proceedings, from the consequences of that incompetence. In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for establishing constitutionally
ineffective assistance of trial counsel: first, the defendant must show
that defense counsel acted unreasonably, that is, contrary to “prevail310
ing professional norms.”
Second, the defendant must show prejudice: that there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the
proceeding would have been different if defense counsel had per311
formed competently.
In Evitts v. Lucey, the Court recognized that
the constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal likewise requires
effective assistance of counsel, for which the Strickland test informs
312
the remedy.
Similarly, recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in filing
a first federal habeas petition would require a remedy for procedural
errors that are attributable to attorney incompetence or lack of counsel altogether. Thus, where the petitioner demonstrates that counsel’s assistance was professionally unreasonable, or denied altogether,
and that one or more of AEDPA’s procedural hurdles precluded habeas review of his claims as a result, he would be entitled to relief.
Such relief could obtain by relieving the inmate from the preclusive
strictures of the procedural doctrine at issue. Thus, for example, the
district court would review the substantive claims in an otherwise
time-barred petition, a procedurally defaulted claim, and/or a
second or successive petition, containing claim(s) overlooked or excluded in the first petition due to attorney error or failure to provide
313
assistance of counsel altogether.
309

310
311
312
313



United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (describing the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (setting forth test for establishing denial of constitutional right to counsel); Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (recognizing due process and equal protection right to counsel
on direct appeal requires effective assistance of counsel).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (1984).
Id. at 692, 694.
469 U.S. at 396–99.
Where attorney error or lack of legal assistance altogether causes omission of a claim
from a first 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, thus requiring petitioner to file a second or successive petition, the only relief available would apply within an ineffective assistance of coun-
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2. Statutory and Equitable Relief from AEDPA’s Strictures
a. Relief from the Statute of Limitations
As discussed, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is responsible for the majority of the federal habeas petitions that federal courts
314
deny for procedural reasons, rather than on the merits.
Recognition of a right to counsel based on access to the courts would mean
that, where counsel fails to advise an inmate accurately regarding the
calculation of the one-year period, two doctrines could supply an inmate with relief.
First, the government’s failure to provide effective assistance of
counsel would constitute an “impediment to filing” and thus, a basis
for statutory tolling, under § 2244(d)(1)(B). Indeed, some federal
courts have already recognized that a state’s failure to provide an inmate with a copy of the federal habeas statute as revised under
AEDPA constitutes an impediment and therefore justifies statutory
tolling of the statute of limitations for the period during which the
315
impediment existed. Thus, where competent counsel is unavailable
to assist an inmate in comprehending and navigating the statute of
limitations within the defined year, the statute of limitations would be
tolled until the inmate receives this assistance.
Second, a lack of competent post-conviction counsel could provide a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The
plight of the pro se inmate in filing within the statute of limitations
has already found some traction in equitable tolling doctrine. For
example, federal courts have applied equitable tolling where counsel
fails to return a petitioner’s file in time to enable the petitioner to
316
timely file his federal petition or where the prison library lacks even

314

315

316



sel framework because the substantive criteria under AEDPA for filing a second or successive petition is limited, in relevant part, to claims showing actual innocence. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2) (2006).
See HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 77, at 8–9 (explaining how
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was a significant departure from the much less
stringent timely filing rule that predated AEDPA); id. at 46, 57 (providing statistics and
analysis of the number of habeas cases dismissed as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations).
See supra note 59 (citing circuit court decisions which have addressed whether a state’s
failure to make available to inmates legal materials pertaining to AEDPA constitutes an
impediment to filing for tolling purposes). As argued in this Article, these cases do not
go far enough. Providing a typical inmate with a copy of the revised statutes provides at
best superficial exposure to an enormously complicated body of law, one which has
evolved primarily through judicial decisions.
See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 957–58, 962 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding for district
court to develop facts to determine whether equitable tolling appropriate based on ha-
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317

a copy of AEDPA. Most recently, the Supreme Court held that extraordinary ineffective assistance of court-appointed post-conviction
counsel, which resulted in a time-barred federal petition in a capital
318
case, may justify equitable tolling.
But thus far, courts have declined to apply equitable tolling based on “ordinary” ineffective assis319
Recognition of an access-based right to counsel
tance of counsel.
would provide a basis for equitable tolling where a petitioner files his
petition outside the one-year period of time as a result of misapprehension of the requirements of the statute of limitations, based in
320
turn on denial of counsel or incompetent assistance of counsel.
Recognition of an access right to counsel would not offer relief
from the exhaustion requirement. But with statutory and equitable
tolling available based on post-conviction counsel’s error, a state petitioner who fails to exhaust all federal claims due to incompetent
counsel would remain able to return to state court to finish exhausting his claims without being time-barred from re-filing under AEDPA.
b. Relief from Procedural Default Doctrine
Similarly, even absent a miscarriage of justice, recognition of an
access right to counsel would enable a petitioner to pursue claims
that are otherwise procedurally defaulted to the extent the default is
the result of faulty advice by post-conviction counsel or denial of
counsel altogether and the petitioner would suffer prejudice as a re-

317

318

319
320

beas counsel’s failure to return case file in time to enable petitioner to timely file his
§ 2254 petition); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding equitable
tolling appropriate based on habeas counsel’s failure to file § 2254 petition or return petitioner’s file throughout the duration of the limitations period and two months beyond).
Cf. Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying equitable tolling based on
counsel’s failure to return case file because petitioner had not shown failure caused him
to miss the one-year deadline).
See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding for district
court to develop facts to determine whether unavailability of AEDPA in prison law library
was an “impediment” to petitioner’s filing, and whether it provides grounds for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations).
See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564–65 (2010) (explaining that the facts in this
case suggest an “extraordinary instance in which petitioner’s attorney’s conduct constituted far more than garden variety or excusable neglect”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Id. at 2564 (explaining that a “garden variety” claim of attorney negligence does not warrant equitable tolling).
Inmates who miss the deadline only as a result of their own lack of due diligence would
not qualify for equitable tolling. See id. at 2562 (noting that equitable tolling applies only
if petitioner shows: “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
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322

sult. As discussed, under AEDPA, the procedural default doctrine
permits review of otherwise defaulted claims where a petitioner can
323
The Sudemonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence.
324
preme Court has not clearly defined either “cause” or “prejudice.”
Although the Court has not articulated a comprehensive list of cir325
cumstances that qualify as “cause,” such event generally must be
326
“some objective factor external to the defense.”
Nonetheless, the
Court has recognized as sufficient cause situations in which the State
impeded or prevented compliance with the procedural rule in ques327
tion or where defense counsel error caused the default at a stage
where petitioner was constitutionally or statutorily entitled to effec328
tive assistance of counsel. Similarly, “cause” to excuse a procedural
default arises where the State denies petitioner a constitutional or statutory right to counsel altogether, thus forcing him to proceed pro
329
se.
In the past year, the Supreme Court has signaled a receptivity to
providing equitable relief from procedural default strictures based on
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. First, in Maples v.
Thomas, the Court recognized as “cause” to excuse procedural default
the abandonment of a death penalty petitioner by state postconviction counsel, without notice to the petitioner or leave of
330
court. As such, assuming prejudice, recognition of an access-to-thecourts right to assistance of counsel in federal habeas proceedings
would qualify as “cause” to excuse procedural defaults caused by ei-

321
322
323

324
325
326
327

328

329
330

Where state post-conviction procedures are sufficiently complex, the access right also may
requires assistance of counsel in navigating those hurdles.
See supra text accompanying notes 143–150 (explaining the procedural default doctrine).
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (establishing the “cause and prejudice”
rule for procedural default doctrine); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750
(1991) (finding state post-conviction counsel’s late filing of appeal in capital case does
not constitute “cause” to excuse procedural default).
See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at §§ 26.3[b], [c] (discussing the imprecise definitions of “cause” and “prejudice,” respectively).
Id. at § 26.3[b]; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533–34 (1986).
2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 40, at § 26.3[b]; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986).
See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691–98 (2004) (finding state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence under Maryland v. Brady qualified as “cause”); Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 283, 289 (1999) (same).
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991) (”Where a petitioner defaults a
claim as a result of the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the
State . . . must bear the cost of any resulting default . . . .”).
See id. at 755–56 (explaining that indigent criminal defendants have a right to counsel in
their first appeal of right).
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927–28 (2012).
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ther attorney error or a federal habeas petitioner’s pro se status.
Most recently, in Martinez v. Ryan, the Court held the failure of state
post-conviction counsel to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, or of the State to provide post-conviction counsel to do so in
the first instance, where under state law post-conviction proceedings
are the first forum available to litigate such claims, provides “cause”
332
to excuse any resulting procedural default in federal court.
In so
holding, the Court underscored the vital role counsel plays in navi333
gating habeas proceedings substantively. Equitable relief based on
recognition of a limited, access-to-the-courts right to counsel would
mimic in function the remedy recognized in Maples and Martinez, albeit with broader application to all procedural errors by pro se litigants, other than those caused by lack of diligence, that result in procedural default.
c. Policy-Based Reforms
As anyone who does death penalty work can attest, states have
failed miserably at providing adequate, effective assistance of counsel
334
to criminal defendants at trial and on direct appeal. The situation
has only grown worse with escalating rates of incarceration and nationwide state budget crises. Thus, at least under the criminal justice
system as currently configured, providing attorneys in all federal postconviction proceedings may well be financially untenable. But as Justice Marshall observed in Bounds v. Smith, “the cost of protecting a
335
constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”
At least several
possibilities exist to enable constitutional compliance without public
financial ruin.
First, because inmates must still be “in custody” as well as have
completed the direct appellate process in order to file a federal habeas petition, federal habeas petitioners are typically those serving
long sentences. Thus, a good starting point would be to re-evaluate
the state sentencing codes. Specifically, states could choose to incarcerate fewer people and for shorter periods of time by revisiting the
misguided policies of the 1980s and 1990s that resulted in the large-

331

332
333
334
335

See Maples v. Thomas, 586 F.3d 879, cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011) (granting review
to determine whether capital habeas counsel’s abandonment of petitioner, in part, constitutes cause to excuse procedural default).
Martinez v. Ryan, No. 10-1001, 2012 WL 912950 (Mar. 20, 2012).
Id. at *7–8.
See supra text accompanying notes 6–8.
430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
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scale incarceration of the American people.
This approach would
free up resources throughout the criminal justice system without
compromising its integrity.
Second, states could simply decline to provide counsel to inmates
as required under an access doctrine but instead, provide the equitable or statutory relief from AEDPA’s procedural strictures as articulated above.
Lastly, and perhaps most simply, Congress could repeal AEDPA.
Indeed, I suspect that if the Supreme Court were to recognize an
access-based constitutional right to counsel in light of AEDPA’s procedural complexities, repeal of AEDPA’s statute of limitations would
quickly follow.
CONCLUSION
In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“[w]hile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are
expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a
337
sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.” What has emerged in
federal habeas practice for non-capital, pro se litigants is precisely
such a slaughter. In the absence of a right to assistance of counsel,
the myriad procedural requirements under AEDPA render too many
pro se litigants helpless in pursuit of the Great Writ, effectively denying them their right of access to the courts. The effect of denying assistance of counsel in ascertaining and complying with AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations and accompanying procedural rules is no
less potent an impediment to judicial review than the obstacles struck
down in the access cases. Thus, absent the fortuity of competent jailhouse counsel, the average pro se inmate lacks an “adequate oppor-

336
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See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008),
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100.pdf
(finding one in one hundred—or 2.3 million—adults in the United States are now behind bars, making the United States the world leader in incarceration rates); Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the
Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 695, 699 (2010) (discussing the Pew
Center study’s findings); see generally Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So
High?, 45 CRIM. & DELINQ. 419 (1999) (exploring explanations for dramatic increase in
U.S. incarceration rates since the 1970s, including the drug war declared in the 1980s and
increasing popularity of recidivist statutes such as California’s three-strikes law).
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
Cronic, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s presumption of ineffectiveness
where a young and inexperienced trial counsel had only twenty-five days to prepare a
complex, serious case and some witnesses were not easily accessible. Id. at 664–67.
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tunity to present his claims fairly” in federal habeas proceedings.
Without assistance of counsel in navigating through AEDPA’s procedural thicket, the pro se petitioner must shoot into the dark at what
has revealed itself to be an elusive and moving target. When he misapprehends the strictures of AEDPA, the courthouse doors slam
shut, often with no remedy available to reopen them.
In short, the reality of post-AEDPA habeas practice demands recognition of a right to counsel to ensure the indigent litigant’s access
to the courts. A right to counsel based on access-to-the-courts doctrine is an inherently limited one in that, after Lewis v. Casey, the right
of access guarantees nothing more than gaining literal entrance
339
through the courthouse door.
Hence, if recognized, such a right
would require competent legal assistance for indigent inmates in navigating and comprehending AEDPA’s procedural requirements, but
nothing more. This right, combined with the equal protection and
due process right outlined in my first article, A Case for a Constitutional
340
Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, which would attach to all claims
for which habeas corpus functions as a first appeal of right, combine
to provide the indigent litigant with a meaningful opportunity to pursue the Great Writ.
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Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
616 (1974).
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996).
60 HASTINGS L.J. 541 (2009).

